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ABSTRACT
This thesis is a study of housing policy implementation by a city public housing agency. It
focuses on: 1) the role of the agency's executives and professional staff in implementing policies and
projects; 2) the continuity of projects across different administrations; and 3) the interactions between
agencies and the target community.
The object of study is the Municipal Department of Housing (DEMHAB) in Porto Alegre,
Brazil, between 1965 and 1990. The analysis of the agency during this 25-year period showed that: 1)
there were alternate periods of consensus and disagreement between executives and professional staff
concerning the criteria for the purchase of land and the selection process for recipients of DEMHAB's
units; 2) there was a high degree of continuity of projects across administrations, despite the change of
political parties ruling the city and executives controlling the agency; and 3) DEMHAB's approach to
community participation in the planning process shifted from antagonism, to acceptance, and eventually
to active support.
These findings raised the following questions: 1) Why did executives follow the
recommendations of professional in certain periods and not in others? What impacts did these decisions
have on the implementation of DEMHAB's programs? 2) Why did DEMHAB achieve such a high
degree of continuity of projects despite frequent changes in administrations? 3) Why did the agency's
attitude toward community participation in the planning process change? What impacts did these
changes have on the implementation of DEMHAB's policies and programs?
The analysis of the evidence led to several conclusions. First, party, electoral and clientelistic
interests often caused executives' actions to differ from technical recommendations. The impacts of
these actions were twofold: on one hand they may have benefitted the target population, for example,
when DEMHAB made purchases of invaded land; on the other hand, they jeopardized the recipients'
fair access to DEMHAB's units, for example, when the established selection criteria for DEMIHAB's
units were not followed. Second, the continuity of projects in DEMHAB was caused mainly by the
intertwining of the particular building and funding processes. Finally, the changes in DEMHAB's
attitude toward the target community were related to 1) the dramatic increase in the last decade of the
housing deficit, and the state's inability to deal with it; 2) the emergence of grassroots movements in the
mid-1970s: and 3) the institutional changes that the country and the city have experienced since 1988,
which opened new channels of popular participation in the formulation and execution of public policies,
particularly at the city level.
Thesis Supervisor: Judith Tendler
Title: Professor of the Department of Urban Studies and Planning
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INTRODUCTION
This thesis examines the housing policy implementation by a city public housing
agency - the Municipal Department of Housing (Departamento Municipal de
Habitagdo-DEMHAB) - in Porto Alegre, Brazil, between 1965 and 1990. The study
focuses on the internal operation of DEMHAB as a public institution within the city
administration over this 25 year period. Specifically, the analysis focuses on the role
of executives and professional staff within the agency, on the continuity of projects
across different administrations, and on the types of relationships between the agency
and its target community.
This study is of particular relevance and importance for two reasons: first,
recently, in 1988 local governments acquired a new role within the Brazilian
institutional framework; and second few studies currently exist that have examined the
implementation of housing policies at a local level in Brazil. Furthermore, my
professional interest as an architect in the housing field sparked my interest in this
subject and enhances this analysis.
In the last three years the National Constitutional Assembly and local legislative
bodies approved national, state and city constitutions, and for the first time since 1962
the country has freely elected its president. The 1988 new federal constitution
expanded the powers and responsibilities of the municipalities. In addition to
preparing urban plans and implementing urban services, local governments now also
share with the state and the union the responsibility for the provision of housing for
the low-income population. Previously, the formulation of housing policies and
programs were centralized with the federal government. The constitution also includes
tax reforms that increase the sharing of federal revenues with states and municipalities
and enhance the city's powers to raise taxes. The institutional changes concerned, not
only the new responsibilities of local governments, but also the new channels of
popular participation at the municipal level. New mechanisms of representation, such
as Popular and Municipal Councils, have allowed citizens to participate in the
formulation of public policies and to control the execution of projects and programs.
Undoubtedly, local governments have, since 1988, acquired an important role in the
implementation of public policies. They now face the challenge of fulfilling these
increased responsibilities.
This challenge is even greater for those progressive administrations with
accountability to constituencies that demand both the decentralization of the decision-
making process and the provision of urban services. These administrations face the
task of carrying out efficient management, of incorporating the new representative
mechanisms into their structure, and of sustaining grassroots participation. In this
situation, public institutions gain substantial importance as the arm of the city
administration in charge of managing urban services, and as structures where popular
participation can be exercised. The study of how public agencies operate, how they
imp-lement programs and how they interact with the target population can help us
understand the new circumstances public administrations face in Brazil.
To begin with, there is an overwhelming need for more low income housing. In
1990, the housing deficit nationwide was estimated to be around 10 million units.
With the average household having four persons per unit, this estimate means that 40
million people, almost 30 percent of the total population, live in substandard
conditions.!
DEMHAB, Reporter, no. 2 (Porto Alegre), July 1990.
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Not only has the public sector neglected the problem, but professionals dealing
with architecture and urban design have also failed to give this issue the attention it
deserves. Architects often give little regard housing for the poor, particularly as
compared with banks and museums, the repositories of architectural excellence of the
20th century. In my opinion, architects have two paths they could follow in the low-
income housing field. One is the search for technological and design alternatives that
will lower costs and optimize use of land and materials. The other is to garner a
greater understanding of the non-technical and non-design issues, that is, the intricate
interrelationships of political, economic, and social aspects that determine or hinder the
solution of housing problems. Given the complexity of the body of knowledge
required by each of these paths, it appears that architects have to make a choice
between them. Yet, in order to act effectively in either area, it is necessary to
understand both. By undertaking this study of a city public housing agency I attempt,
as a design-oriented architect, to understand the second path.
During the last two decades, many studies have analyzed the BNH low- income
housing programs. This extensive literature, however, has focused mostly on the
performance and implementation of policies at a national level, few authors have
concentrated on regional or local issues. Exceptions to this national focus are the
regional studies done by Sachs in Sio Paulo and Pereira in Rio Grande do Sul. Sachs
studied the limitations of a state Housing Company (Companhia de Habitagio-
COHAB) in providing low-income housing in Sdo Paulo. Pereira presented the
provision of low-income housing as playing a key role in the strategy for hegemony of
urban dominant classes in Rio Grande do Sul since 1890.2
2 Celine Sachs, "Evolution et Limites de la Promotion Publique de Logements Populaires a Sio Paulo
1964-1985" (Ph.D. diss., Paris XII, 1987); Luiza H. Pereira, "Habitao Popular no Rio Grande do Sul-
1890/1980" (Master thesis, UFRGS, Porto Alegre, 1980).
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In 1964, the newly installed military regime instituted the Housing Finance System
(Sistema Financeiro de Habitagio-SFH) to implement housing policies nationwide.?
From 1965 to 1986, the National Housing Bank (Banco Nacional de Habitagdo-BNH)
centralized and regulated the implementation of housing policies in Brazil.4 BNH
operated through regional and local agencies in charge of the finance and management
of BNH's projects. The Municipal Department of Housing (DEMHAB) was
distinguished among the various city and state agencies established by BNH because
of its previous experience in the provision of low-income housing and unserviced plots
in the city of Porto Alegre. DEMHAB evolved from the existing Municipal
Department of Popular Housing (Departamento Municipal da Casa Popular-DMCP)
created in 1952 by the city government to build and finance affordable housing for the
urban low-income population.
Since 1965, the main responsibilities of DEMHAB have been the design,
construction and financing of housing units and lots, the provision of urban
infrastructure (roads, water, sewer and electricity lines) to existing unserviced
settlements, and the implementation of self-help programs, in Porto Alegre.
MwMHAB has been part of a national housing program and has utilized mainly
federal resources to implement its projects. Porto Alegre is the capital of Rio Grande
do Sul, the southern most state of Brazil. Like many other third-world cities, it
experienced rapid growth in the last five decades as a result of natural growth and
migration. Whereas in 1940 the total population was 272,232, by 1990, this figure
3 In 1964 a military junta had taken power through a coup and remained in power until 1985, when an
electoral college chose a civilian president.
4 In November of 1986, as part of an economic stabilization plan (Plano Cruzado II), the Federal
government abolished the BNH and transferred its functions to the Federal Savings Bank (Caixa Econ6mica
Federal-CEF) and the Central Bank of Brazil.
had jumped to 1,431,924 (see Table 2). The demographic explosion was followed by
a scarcity of housing to shelter the increasing population. From 1965 to 1990 the
proportion of squatters among the total population grew from just 9 percent to 24
percent (see Table 1). During the last 25 years, Brazil has undergone a gradual
transition from a military dictatorship with non-elected mayors and governors to a
democratic regime with free elections at the local, state and national levels. Porto
Alegre experienced various changes in administration during this period. The city is
now ruled by the Popular Front (Frente Popular-FP), which, in 1988, won the
municipal elections for the first time.'
In order to study internal aspects of a particular institution, I chose to examine
DEMHAB, which provided access to documentation and to people involved in the
daily work of the agency. My main objectives were to examine: 1) the role of the
agencies' executives and technical staff in implementing policies and projects in
DEMHAB; 2) the continuity of projects across different administrations; and, 3) the
types of interaction between DEMHAB and the target community during the past 25
years. I carried out field work over five weeks during October and November, 1990,
through open-ended interviews with the present and former directors of DEMHAB and
with technical staff of various departments of the agency, including both new and
more experienced personnel. For this five weeks period, I was in daily contact with
DEMHAB's employees. I focused the study primarily on prof-essional staff and
executives. However, I also had informal conversations with other workers in
DEMHAB. These informal interviews proved to be very informative and stimulated
the search for different kinds of data. To get other perspectives on DEMHAB's
' The FP was a coalition of left wing parties including the Workers Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores-
PT), the Brazilian Communist Party (Partido Comunista Brasileiro-PCB) and the Brazilian Socialist Party
(Partido Socialista Brasileiro-PSB).
actions, I also interviewed presidents of Community Associations of housing
complexes built by DEMHAB, and Non-governmental Organizations (NGO's) that
have given technical assistance to these associations. These interviews represent the
empirical base of this study. Where possible, interview data were corroborated with
official statistical series.
There are several important findings of this study. First, executives' actions often
did not follow technical recommendations. The disagreement between technical
personnel and executives centered on the criteria for the purchase of land and the
selection of DEMHAB's beneficiaries. Second, there was a substantial degree of
continuity of projects across different administrations, despite the change of political
parties ruling the city and executives controlling the agency. Third, in DEMHAB's
approach to com-munity participation in the agency's activities there was a shift from
antagonism, then to acceptance and eventually, to active support.
Friction between different levels of bureaucracy was common in the daily
activities of public institutions. A case in point was the conflict between the
professional staff and the executive of the agency. Technical solutions do not always
meet the interests of political parties in power or the aims of different groups in
society. DEMHAB was no exception. These frictions, however, were not present
equally throughout the 25 years of this study. Why did executives follow the
recommendations of technical personnel in certain periods and not in others? What
impact did these decisions have on the implementation of DEMHAB's programs? In
general, the ability of executives and the professional staff did not appear to be strictly
determined by the type of regime in power. Indeed, good working relations were
experienced in both authoritarian and democratic regimes. What were the conditions
that contributed to common characteristics in such distinct political environments?
The relationship between the political nature of the executives' positions and
DEMHAB's dealing with highly demanded goods such as urban land and housing
should illuminate the answers to these questions.
Frequently development experts argue that changes in government threaten the
continuity of agency policies and programs. Personnel turnover, new political
priorities, and the desire of politicians and executives to imprint their personal marks
on the city administration and environment each have the potential to disrupt policy-
making and implementation. This danger seems particularly acute in DEMHAB, since
DEMHAB's present and former executives, and representatives of community
organizations, pointed to DEMHAB as one of the most politicized institutions of the
city government. The main reason for this is that DEMHAB could offer to its
executives in case of future candidacy for elected positions. Contrary to these views, I
found that DEMHAB had a high degree of continuity of projects across different
administrations from 1970 through 1990. DEMHAB had some projects that began in
one administration and were completed by subsequent administrations. Among various
examples, the Nova Restinga project was the most important because of the size and
time taken for its implementation.' Only once during the period analyzed did a new
administration modify projects approved by former administrations. In one case, the
project was changed from walk-up buildings to sites and services, and in the other
case a site reserved for a park was subdivided into lots.
I was intrigued by this contradiction between expectation and reality. Is
DEHMAB an exception? Is the connection between new administrations and
disruption of projects true for some types of programs and not for others? Moreover,
if DEMHAB's executives were not changing policies, how were they leaving their
6 See Appendix B for a description of the Nova Restinga Project.
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marks on the city environment? How were they distributing patronage? Why did
DEMHAB administrations not use these wellknown devices for imprinting the image
of the new administration? This research suggests that at least part of the answer
comes from the types of projects involved. Specifically, I shall argue that
characteristics unique to the construction process and the funding of construction
projects makes them less vulnerable to disruption than non-construction projects.
From 1965 through 1990 the response of the city government to the growing
number of settlements on invaded areas shifted from antagonism, to acceptance, and
finally to support.7 This shift in attitudes towards squatters had parallels in
DEMHAB's interactions with its recipients, which evolved from top-down style
focused on individuals to relations directed more from the bottom-up by community
groups. Whereas the earlier style emphasized personal contacts between executives
and individuals, the later approach stimulated interaction between representatives of
the community and the various departments of DEMHAB as a means to resolve
problems. This type of relationship reinforced the use of institutional channels for the
resolution of problems because it emphasized procedures, rather than individuals, for
carrying out the agency's activities. Particularly in the last two years, the communities
affected by DEMHAB's sites and services projects have participated in
implementation, through the discussion of selection criteria for DEMHAB's recipients.
Why did the agency's attitude toward community participation in the planning process
change? What impacts did these changes have on the implementation of DEMHAB's
7 Geoffrey Payne mentions these trends at an international level, when discussing public sector
responses to the illegal subdivisions, in Informal Housing and Land Subdivisions in Third World Cities: A
Review of the Literature (Oxford: Oxford Polytechnic, Centre for Development and Environmental Planning,
1989) 37-42.
policies? My answers to these questions focus on placing DEMHAB into the political
national and local context.
The organization of this thesis follows the sequence of the findings and the
questions they raised. The first chapter provides information about DEMHAB in the
housing finance system structure and the city environment. The second chapter
focuses on the discrepancy between technical recommendations and executives' actions
in the management of DEMHAB. The criteria for land purchase and for the selection
of DEMHAB's beneficiaries are examined as the main causes of disagreement. The
third chapter discusses the intertwining of the construction and funding processes as
possible causes of the high degree of continuity of projects in DEMHAB during the
last 25 years. It also addresses the impacts of the closure of the National Housing
Bank on DEMHAB's implementation of projects. Chapter Four examines the
different patterns of relationship between DEMHAB and beneficiaries over time,
placing DEMHAB within the changing political and institutional environment of Porto
Alegre and Brazil. In the final chapter, I review my findings, drawing some
conclusions, and suggest issues for further research.
CHAPTER ONE
DEMHAB IN THE NATIONAL AND LOCAL CONTEXT
This chapter describes the close linkages between DEMHAB as a local agency and
BNH as a national institution, and the role of the agency within the city environment.
The first section places DEMHAB within the national context, from the standpoint of
BNH and the Housing Finance System' structure, and discusses the impacts of national
economic crisis of the 1980s on DEMHAB and BNH. The second section places
DEMHAB within the context of the city. In describing the agency's origins and the
evolution of DEMHAB since 1965, the second section provides the framework for the
analysis of the three main subjects of this thesis, that is, the relationship between
executives and professional staff, the continuity of projects, and the interaction of
DEMHAB with its recipients over the last 25 years.
DEMHAB in the National Context
DEMHAB as an Agent of BNH
In August of 1964, the new military dictatorship created BNH and the Housing
Finance System (SFH) to coordinate public housing policies, to stimulate private
savings and investments, and to foster the construction industry. From 1964 to 1970
BNH concentrated on the provision of housing units. During the 1970s, however, the
bank expanded its work to include urban development projects, particularly the
provision of infrastructure to the projects under its aegis. From 1969 to 1976, the
proportion of BNH resources devoted to urban development rose from 4 percent to 34
percent.' Despite the importance of BNH as a housing and development bank, I will
'Sergio Azevedo and Luiz A.G. Andrade, HabitaCo e Poder (Rio de Janeiro: Zahar, 1982), 86-87.
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not discuss BNH's policies and programs, but rather place DEMHAB within BNH's
structure by comparing the agency with other Housing Companies (COHABs). 2
BNH operated through regional and local agencies - the Housing Companies
(Companhias de Habitagio- COHABs). COHABs were in charge of building,
financing and selling housing units to the target population (families with incomes of 3
minimum salaries or less).3 In some cases, these public agencies were part of the
structure of city governments; in others they were independent agencies linked to the
state government. The former were structures that already existed within the
municipal government apparatus, and they adapted their goals and responsibilities to
implement the new national housing policies. In places where such structures did not
exist, BNH created new agencies to carry out the national housing programs.
DEMHAB was in the first category, as it emerged from an existing city housing
agency. Despite the establishment of DEMHAB in the capital of the state, BNH also
created a Housing Company in Rio Grande do Sul (COHAB-RS) to manage and
finance low-income housing statewide.
DEMHAB had a different cycle from the other COHABs in Brazil. Until 1980,
they all experienced periods of implementation, expansion, decline, and restoration, but
DEMHAB went through these periods in its own way.4 For an illustration, Graph 2
shows the amount of production by DEMHAB and COHAB in Rio Grande do Sul. It
shows that the decline period of the COHAB-RS (1970-1975) corresponded to the
implementation and expansion period of DEMHAB. The reason for this difference in
cycles between COHAB-RS and DEMHAB is the late entry of DEMHAB into the
2 Appendix A provides more information about BNH structure, policies and programs.
3 This limit was increased for 5 and later to 10 minimum wages.
4 On COHAB's cycles see Azevedo and Andrade, Habitaco e Poder, 67.
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Housing Finance System. Whereas COHAB-RS started operating in 1965, DEMHAB
signed its accord with BNH in the end of 1969. At its implementation stage,
DEMHAB did not experience the effects of high default rates that were plaguing other
COHABs with already on-going projects. In general, from 1965 to 1980, the
COHABs had the following phases:
1) Implementation and Expansion, 1965-1969: BNH spent great sums of money on
the construction of low-income housing to legitimize the regime and to consolidate the
housing finance system.
2) Decline, 1970-1975: BNH shifted its loans to higher income groups, decreasing
drastically the investments in low-income housing to reduce the high rates of default.
This default was mainly caused by the gap between the decreasing purchasing power
of the borrowers and BNH's increasing monthly installments. Adjusted wages lagged
far behind rising mortgage payments..
3) Restoration, 1975-1980: BNH redirected loans to the low-income market and there
was an increase in the COHABs' production. In these years the upper income limit
for the low-income market was raised from 5 to 10 minimum wages, allowing higher
income workers to enter this market. Because the burden of the monthly payments for
families earning 10 minimum wages was much less than for those living at the poverty
line, the default rates dropped significantly during this period.
After 1980, both COHAB-RS and DEMHAB had similar cycles of expansion until
1985, and sharp decline until 1990. The national economic recession and the closure
of BNH in 1986 were the main causes for the big reduction in the provision of low-
income housing in Brazil.
* During the 1960s, the wage policy caused a steady drop in the real value of salaries. The real
minimum wage in 1974 was 30 percent less than in 1964. See Azevedo and Andrade, Habitaco e Poder,
69.
DEMHAB, BNH and the Economic Crisis
In the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s, Brazil's economic crisis deeply
affected the housing finance system. The measures imposed by the IMF since 1983 to
stabilize the economy and fight inflation caused a severe recession in the whole
economy, including the housing and land sectors. The recession affected the housing
finance system through a large reduction from its funding sources, causing changes in
the terms of mortgage loans and sharply reducing the production of housing units.
The recession eroded the two main sources of the housing finance system, the
compulsory and voluntary savings, and jeopardized loan repayments. The compulsory
savings corresponded to eight percent of the wages of regular workers collected
monthly by the state and formed the Length of Service Guarantee Fund (Fundo da
Garantia por Tempo de Servigo-FGTS). Thrift institutions captured the voluntary
savings through the Indexed Savings Accounts (Cadernetas de Poupanga-CPs). The
CPs paid six percent annual interest and their balances were adjusted for inflation
every three months.
The loss of real income caused by the salary policies from 1979 to 1984 deeply
affected the FGTS, CPs and loan repayments.' The contributions to the FGTS
decreased because of the decrease of real salaries. In addition, high unemployment
rates caused families to withdraw their deposits for living expenses, sharply reducing
the FGTS funds.' The deposits in the CPs also suffered a significant fall, because of
the impact of the salary policy in the purchasing power of depositors. Finally, the
default rate was enormous, both because of the disparity between salary and mortgage
6 David Vetter mentions that BNH mortgage holders had a loss of up to 60 percent of their real income
in the 1979-84 period in "Financing National Investment Programs for Human Settlements Development
in Brazil," (Draft, 25 September 1989), 39.
7 The workers could withdraw the FGTS in case of illness, retirement or unemployment.
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adjustments and because of a national movement carried out by mortgage holders to
withdraw their payments in protest against the BNH policies. The default rates in
DEMHAB reached a peak of 89 percent in 1982 and 1983. These figures oscillated
between 80 and 57 percent until 1988, and dropped significantly to 28 percent in 1989
(see Table 9). Administrative changes undertaken after 1988 that renegotiated older
debts and accelerated the collection of payments contributed to this fall.
In 1984, in response to the organization of BNH borrowers, the government
changed the adjustment of mortgage payments to rates below the monetary correction,
exempting the borrowers for amortizing the full mortgage. The remainder would be
covered by the already existing Fund for Compensation of Salary Variations (Fundo de
Compensagio de Variagio Salarial-FCVS) and the federal budget. While this measure
benefitted BNH mortgage holders, it threatened the whole housing finance system by
widening its deficit. According to the Federal Savings Bank (CEF) estimates, the
mortgage payments were only covering 15 percent of their real value.8
In November of 1986, as part of a second economic stabilization plan (Plano
Cruzado II), the federal government abolished the BNH and transferred its functions to
the CEF and the Central Bank. Since then, CEF has significantly reduced the loans
for both low- and high-income housing.
Table 7 illustrates the impact of the BNH closure on the production of housing at city,
state and national levels. DEMHAB's production declined from 1,924 units in 1985 to
96 in 1986. The national government that took office in January of 1990 did not set a
policy for the provision of low-income housing. Its only action to date has been an
emergency plan to finance the construction of 3.6 million low-income units to partially
cover the estimated deficit of 10 million units.
8 Vetter, Financing National Investment Programs, 40.
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DEMHAB in the Local Context
The Origins of DEMHAB, 1946-1%5: a Background
DEMHAB's origins date back to 1946. The institution has had three distinct
periods. The years between 1946 and 1952 constituted.the preliminary period of the
institution's implementation, when it suffered changes in its functions and in the types
of linkages to the municipal administration. During the second period, 1952 to 1965,
the city government formed the Municipal Department of Popular Housing (DMCP),
an autonomous organization with institutional capacity to carry out the city's housing
policies for the low-income population. In 1965, the transformation of DMCP into the
Municipal Department of Housing (DEMHAB) marked the beginning of the third
period, when the agency restructured its organization to implement the new national
housing policy. In this section I will briefly describe these transformations, focusing
on the structural, financial, and functional aspects of each period.
The Preliminary Organizations In 1946, the lack of housing in Porto Alegre
constituted an increasing problem for the working class and, as a consequence, illegal
settlements began to appear. The municipal government, under the pressure of a
coalition of local labor unions, formed a committee to study the situation and for the
first time faced the problem of sheltering the poor.' Not until 1949, however, did the
municipality formally set up a program, the Service of Housing (Servigo de
Habitagio), in charge of providing housing for the low-income population. In 1950,
the Service of Housing became the Popular Housing Supervision (Superintendncia da
Habitagio Popular), which would supervise and coordinate the provision of low-cost
9 In a letter directed to the Mayor of Porto Alegre, 12 August 1946, 25 Labor Unions requested the
municipal government take action concerning the housing shortage for the working class. DEMHAB,
Archives, 1946.
housing for the urban poor. It was directly linked to the mayor's cabinet and it had
neither administrative nor financial autonomy. Its main action was the establishment of
a committee to study alternative solutions for the housing problem. In 1951, the
committee of Popular Housing Supervision conducted a detailed survey of the squatter
population in Porto Alegre. The survey showed that 4 percent of the population lived
in 41 illegal settlements spread throughout the urban area (see Table 1). The
committee also identified access to land as the key issue to solve the housing problem
of the urban poor and recommended that the city government include the provision of
lots as a priority in its housing policy.'"
The Municipal Department of Popular Housing, DMCP In 1952, with the
acceleration of new illegal settlements, the city government transformed the Popular
Housing Supervision into an independent department, the Municipal Department of
Popular Housing (Departamento Municipal da Casa Popular-DMCP) to carry out the
recommendations of the committee. The newly created DMCP was in charge of the
execution of the city's public housing policy and the coordination of social assistance
to the squatter population. DMCP was divided into three main sections: the office of
the Director and the staff; the Fiscal Board; and the DMCP Council. The Fiscal Board
budgeted the revenues of the institution. The relationship of the DMCP Council and
the Director was the same as that of the City Council and the Mayor in the city of
Porto Alegre. The DMCP Council consisted of community representatives from
professional, labor, and neighborhood associations. It included one representative of
the community associations and one of the labor unions of Porto Alegre. This
10 PMPA, Levantamento Econ6mico Social das Malocas Existentes em Porto Alegre (Porto Alegre:
PMPA/Globo, 1951), 4. Besides this survey, there were no data available in DEMHAB's archives regarding
budget, organization, and other actions of the various structures pre-1952.
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representation, however, was not very effective, because of the limited experience of
residents and workers participating in urban and housing policy issues.
The municipal government created the Popular Housing Financing Tax (Taxa de
Financiamento da Casa Popular) to form a special fund for the financing of DMCP's
projects. The tax collected 3 percent of the total cost of every new construction over
150 square meters." The municipality paid the salaries of DMCP's employees and
provided additional funding for special projects. An administrative tax charged on
every project managed by DMCP covered maintenance and operational expenses of
the agency. At that time, the terms of financing did not include indexing instruments
to adjust unpaid mortgages. DMCP utilized a system of fixed rate mortgages. The
maturity of the loan offered to the borrowers varied from 5 to 20 years, with an
interest rate of five percent a year.
Following the guidelines set up by the former Housing Supervision, DMCP
declared large tracts of land as public domain, bought them and subdivided them into
300 m2 lots. Some of the projects included the construction of 42 m2 wooden houses.
To lower costs for the agency and the borrowers, these settlements were not serviced
by infrastructure. From 1952 to 1964, DMCP financed 2,440 low-cost houses and
5,190 lots. Despite these measures, the squatter population grew steadily. During the
same period, the proportion of squatters in the total population in the city jumped from
4 percent to almost 9 percent (see Table 1).
The Municipal Department of Housing, DEMHAB In 1965, DMCP underwent a
restructuring because of the emergence of BNH and the Housing Finance System,
" The tax was actually a compulsory loan from the tax payers to the city, since the government would
return the money through a 20 percent discount of the property tax during a maximum period of ten years
or the necessary time to pay the debt.
which formed the spine of the social policies of the newly installed regime. The
former DMCP became the Department of Municipal Housing (Departamento
Municipal de Habitagio-DEMHAB) in order to conform to new institutional rules.
The new national housing policy required agencies to manage the design, construction
and financing of BNH's projects. In order to fulfill these requirements, from 1965 to
1969 DEMHAB restructured its organization from a multi-service to a specialized
agency. In 1969, DEMHAB entered the housing finance system.
At first glance, the change in DEMHAB's structure was not readily apparent. The
three main divisions of the institution remained the same: the DEMHAB Council, the
Office of the Director and the Fiscal Board. The composition of the Council,
however, was changed. The representation of the Community Associations was
suspended and the representation of the labor unions had to be appointed by the state,
instead of being freely elected by its constituency. Regardless of the degree of
participation and influence these institutions had in the decision-making process of
DEMHAB, the channels for their continuing participation were cut off. This was the
era of arbitrary rules and of purges in the bureaucracy, military, university and labor
unions.
In 1965, as a replacement for the Housing Financing Tax, the city government
created the Housing Municipal Fund (Fundo Municipal de Habitagio) to generate
resources for the implementation of the city's housing policies." The main sources
of the fund were the revenues generated by the Social Welfare Tax (Taxa de
Assistencia Social). The fund received 35 percent of this tax, which was collected by
the city government and transferred to DEMHAB. The municipality maintained the
funding for the payroll of DEMHAB's employees. The incorporation of DEMHAB
1 Porto Alegre, Municipal Law no. 2903, (December, 1965).
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into the housing finance system in 1969 added federal funds to the existing municipal
resources. The proportion of BNH's resources in DEMHAB's revenues began at 50
percent and reached 90 percent in 1990." Neither the Housing Financing Tax nor
the Housing Municipal Fund proved to generate enough resources to cover the
agency's needs for the provision of low-income housing in Porto Alegre. These
initiatives showed the limitations of local governments' abilities to generate resources
for the provision of low-income housing. The borrowers' financing terms also
changed with the transformation of DMCP into DEMHAB. Until 1969, the agency
continued using the fixed mortgage system that included a limit of 25 percent of the
borrower's income when calculating the monthly payments of the loans. After 1969,
DEMHAB adopted BNH's terms and conditions for the loans. DEMHAB charged
between 1 and 10 percent interest rate a year, depending on the size of the loan. The
mortgage loan varied from 20 to 25 years. In 1975 the highest interest rates were
reduced from 10 percent to 8.6 percent. BNH also introduced indexing instruments as
a means to fight inflation and the decapitalization of the housing finance system."
The four years between 1965 and 1969 constituted a period of preparation for
DEMHAB's actions in the subsequent years. During this groundwork phase, the
agency restructured its organization from a multi-service agency to a specialized and
technical institution. It dismissed all activities related to social and health assistance
that DEMHAB had executed over the past years, and concentrated on the
implementation of the national housing policy. The city administration transferred all
welfare and health activities to the Secretary of Health. The juridical change from
13 Gladimiro Dantas, Financial and Administrative Division of DEMHAB, interview, 6 November 1990,
Porto Alegre.
" Appendix A describes BNH's index system.
DMCP to DEMHAB in 1965 was not merely a change of names. Despite maintaining
its administrative and financial autonomy, DEMHAB explicitly linked its policies and
structure to the technocratic principles of the national regime. The introductory
statement in the law that regulated DEMHAB showed a clear desire to
promote the housing policy of social interest in harmony with the central and state
governments."
The goals of the housing policy in the social interest were
to withdraw the dwellers from the urban substandard houses, in order to promote
new and better dwellings for their integration into the spiritual, economic and
cultural life of the community.' 6
Besides establishing linkages between local and central governments, in accordance
with the new regime's institutional and economic centralization policies, the law stated
the clear intention of promoting squatter removal from the invaded areas. The
creation of BNH and the centralization of resources and policies enabled the regime to
implement a nationwide removal program. 7 From 1965 to 1970, following the
national housing policy, DEMHAB removed 5,400 units, corresponding to 25,300
people. The authoritarian and repressive apparatus that supported the military
dictatorship not only discouraged negotiation, but also crushed any attempt at
resistance by the squatter residents. In 1965, the squatters in Porto Alegre totaled
65,600, and accounted for almost 9 percent of the city's population (see Table 1).
'5 Porto Alegre, Municipal Law no. 2902 (December, 1965).
16 Ibid.
17 On the impacts of favela removal policies in Brazil see Janice Perlman, "The Failure of Influence:
Squatter Eradication in Brazil," in Politics and Policy Implementation in the Third World, ed. Merilee
Grindel (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980) 250-278.
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The Evolution of DEMHAB, 1965-1990: a Framework
Since 1965 DEMHAB has subdivided lots, built houses, and implemented
infrastructure in settlements for low-income population. The beginning of the 1970s,
however, marked the outset of a very active intervention of DEMHAB in the provision
of low-income housing, because of its incorporation into the housing finance system as
an agent of BNH in Porto Alegre. I divided the 1965-1990 period into four distinct
phases. This division followed chronological and topical criteria. The shifts of parties
ruling the city were the basic criteria, because they brought changes in styles of
administration. These shifts had effects in the three aspects I analyze in this study,
namely the role of executives and professional staff, the continuity of projects, and the
interaction of the agency with its target population. Hereafter, I will refer to
professional staff as tecnicos. Tecnicos are the civil servants who have university
education, hold junior or senior positions in the hierarchy of the institution and deal
with the technical issues of the daily work. A tecnico may be an architect, engineer,
lawyer, economist, sociologist, etc. The permanence of the party in power during the
first 20 years caused a division of the first phase into two, to facilitate the analysis.
The change in the city mayor and modifications in DEMHAB's actions were the main
criteria for this separation. The phases are as follows: Phase I, from 1965 to 1975;
Phase II, from 1976 to 1985; Phase III, from 1986 to 1988; and Phase IV, from 1989
to 1990.18
I constructed a table to facilitate the analysis and to better understand: 1)
DEMHAB's phases, their corresponding time periods, and parties ruling the city; and
18 For a complete table that places DEMHAB within the city, state and national government see Table
5.
2) the changes regarding three aspects -- friction between executives and tecnicos,
continuity of projects, and community interaction.
EVOLUTION OF DEMHAB, 1965-1990
.Period .Regime .Executives .Continuity of .Community Interaction
.Party and Tecnicos Projects
.PHASE I .Bureaucratic- .less friction .continuity .Antagonism
1965/75 Authoritarian .no community interaction
.Conservative-PDS .no empowerment
.PHASE II .Bureaucratic- .more friction .continuity .Limited Acceptance
1976/85 Authoritarian 
.community interaction
.Conservative-PDS .no empowerment
.PHASE III .Democratic .more friction .less continuity .Acceptance
1986/88 .Populist-PDT .BNH closure .community interaction
.empowerment
.PHASE IV .Democratic .less friction .continuity .Support
1989/90 .Progressive-PT 
.community interaction
.more empowerment
Regimes and Parties The conservative Democratic Social Party (PDS-Partido
Democrdtico Social) represented the coalition of civilian and military elites. This
party ruled the country and the city during Phases I and II, from 1965 to 1985.'9
The central government reached power through a military coup and has been classified
by observers as a bureaucratic-authoritarian regime. The bureaucratic-authoritarian
concept was formulated by Latin American scholars in the beginning of the 1970s, to
explain the authoritarian and military governments that have ruled Brazil from 1964 to
1985. According to this concept,
19 From 1964 until 1979, when the government carried out a party reform, there were only two parties
in the political system: the Alliance for National Renovation (Alianga Renovadora Nacional-ARENA)
representing the government; and the Brazilian Democratic Movement (Movimento Democritico Brasileiro-
MDB) representing the opposition to the regime. In 1979, ARENA changed its name to PDS. For the sake
of this study, I will refer to ARENA as PDS within the text, and maintain its original nomenclature for
bibliographical references.
bureaucratic-authoritarian systems are "excluding" and emphatically non-
democratic. Central actors in the dominant coalition include high-level
technocrats--military and civilian, within and outside the state--working in close
association with foreign capital. This new elite eliminates electoral competition
and severely controls the political participation of the popular sector.20
The dominant coalition that took power in 1964 believed that the emphasis on
technocratic parameters for the implementation of public policies within a non-
electoral environment would combat the clientelistic practices found in the previous
elected populist regime, and would foster development and modernization of the
economy.' The concept of linking clientelism to electoral systems and the absence
of clientelism to non-electoral systems has already been contradicted by studies which
show that clientelistic practices are also present in non-elected regimes.
In November of 1985, for the first time since the military had taken power, there
were free elections for state governments. The candidate of the populist Labor
Democratic Party (PDT-Partido Democrdtico Trabalhista) won the elections in Porto
Alegre, and administered the city until the end of 1988, governing a period
corresponding to DEMHAB's Phase III. PDT represented a coalition of workers and
20 David Collier, ed., The New Authoritarianism in Latin America (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1979), 24. See also Guillermo O'Donnell, Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism
(Berkeley: University of California, Institute of International Studies, 1973), and Fernando Henrique
Cardoso, "Associated Dependent Development: Theoretical and Practical Implications", in Alfred Stepan,
ed., Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies and Future (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973).
21 Clientelism is the exchange of favors on a network of channels other than the institutional ones to
appeal and grant of services, commodities or even job positions. Nepotism and patronage are particular
forms of clientelism. Nepotism is the favoritism by those in power to their relatives by giving them
desirable appointments. Patronage is also the power to give political jobs or favors.
22 For a discussion about the politicization of a public institution within the military regime in Brazil,
see Eliza Jane Willis, "The Politicized Bureaucracy: Regimes, Presidents and Economic Policy in Brazil"
(Ph.D. diss.. Boston College, 1989).
elites that characterized populism in Latin America.' The progressive Workers Party
(PT-Partido dos Trabalhadores), which took office in January of 1989, was a labor-
union based party that also included segments of lower and median classes.
Executives and Tecnicos, Continuity and Community Interaction
The degrees of friction in the third column of the table refer to the major or minor
discrepancy between executives' actions and tecnicos' recommendations for the
purchase of land and for the selection of recipients for DEMHAB's units. The legal
status and inadequate topographic conditions were the main causes of frictions
regarding the purchase of land. The violation of some of the established rules for the
selection of recipients, namely the applicants' income and date of enrollment in the
waiting list, caused the conflicts regarding the selection of DEMHAB's recipients.
The degrees of continuity of projects in the fourth column of the table refer to two
aspects: 1) the continuity in time, which encompasses higher or lower pace of
implementation; and 2) the continuity in terms of changes in the original project.
During Phase III, there were some projects that were substantially changed, creating a
process of less continuity. The other phases had both continuity in time and in the
characteristics of the project. The phases of the building process along with the steps
and particular characteristics of the funding process in DEMHAB contributed to this
continuity.
DEMHAB's forms of interaction with the community have been marked by
antagonism, limited acceptance, acceptance, and support. Following are the definitions
of these various patterns of interaction.
23 Populism in Latin America is the nationalist state that intervenes in the economy, and at the same
time associates the urban working class with the state's interests, through paternalistic actions to neutralize
the proletariat as a political force.
Antagonism: Community participation is not accepted or encouraged as part of
the decision-making process of the city or of DEMHAB's policies. Any means and
channels of participation are cut off. The actions of the institution favor interests of
other groups and not those of the low-income groups. The squatter removal policy is
an example of such an action. The interaction is done on an individual-individual
basis.
Limited acceptance: Community participation is recognized but not included in
the process of planning. The channels of participation -- community organizations --
are outside the institutional environment of the city or DEMHAB. Community
organizations, however, do not have enough power to cause substantial changes in
policies. The reawakening of grassroots movements and the recognition by the state
of the magnitude of urban housing problems have forced government agencies to
accept community participation, not with the objective of empowerment, but rather
with the goal of sharing costs and facilitating the implementation of projects.24 The
actions of the agency reflect state concessions to the previously unfavored sectors.
The purchase of invaded land instead of squatter removal efforts by DEMHAB during
Phase II is an example of such concession. The basis for interaction is an individual-
individual relationship.
Acceptance: At a city level, community participation in the planning process is
recognized and stimulated through the establishment of the Popular Councils. Popular
Councils are autonomous structures formed by community organizations within a
certain region of the city. Their goal is to gather these communities for the discussion
24 Samuel Paul, besides empowerment, mentions building beneficiary capacity, increasing project
effectiveness, improving project efficiency, and project cost sharing, as other objectives of community
participation, in "Community Participation in Development Projects: The World Bank Experience" in The
Role of Community Participation in Development Planning and Projects, ed. Michael Bamberger
(Washington D.C.: World Bank, 1988) 36.
and formulation of proposals to be implemented by the city government. DEMHAB
has incorporated some of the proposals in their projects. The actions of the agency
include self-help projects with the objective of sharing costs and empowering the
community.
Support: In 1990, with the creation of the Municipal Councils, the city
government has institutionalized the participation of community organizations within
its administration. The goals of these councils are to propose, control, and decide on
issues of the different sectors of the public administration. They comprise community
associations, professional associations and representatives of the municipal
government. Popular and Municipal Councils differ by the kind of connection to the
city government: whereas the Popular Councils are independent organizations, the
Municipal Councils are part of the government. The relationship of the institution
with the community is done through a collective-collective basis, enhancing the
empowerment of the community.
The above definitions give the framework for this study. When discussing the
changes related to the role of executives and tecnicos, continuity of projects, and
community interaction in DEMHAB in the next chapters, I will introduce each chapter
with the table showing the evolution of DEMHAB and highlight the issues that are
being addressed.
CHAPTER TWO
EXECUTIVES AND TECNICOS IN DEMHAB
EVOLUTION OF DEMHAB- 1965/1990
.Period .Regime .Continuity of .Community Interaction
.Party jE, Projects
.PHASE I .Bureaucratic- 
.continuity .Antagonism
1965115 Authoritarian [ 7,. 5.... .no community interaction
.Conservative-PDS .no empowenment
.PHASE H .Bureaucratic- .continuity .Limited Acceptance
1976/85 Authoritarian 
.community interaction
.Conservative-PDS . .no empowement
.PHASE IM .Democratic .less continuity .Acceptance
1986/88 .Populist-PDT .. .BNH closure .community interaction
.empowerment
.PHASE IV .Democratic continuity .Support
1989/90 .Progressive-PT 
.community interaction
.more empowenment
This chapter identifies the two main causes of friction between executives and
tecnicos, and addresses the following questions: 1) why did these frictions develop in
some periods and not in others; and 2) how did these conflicts affect the
implementation of projects in DEMHAB, from the standpoint of beneficiaries, tecnicos
and executives? This chapter has four sections. In the first section, I explain the role
of executives and tecnicos within the organization of DEMHAB. In the second
section, drawing on interviews and some quantitative data, I compare executives' and
tecnicos' positions regarding the criteria for the purchase of land and for the selection
and distribution of DEMHAB's units. In the third section, I place DEMHAB within
the context of local and national politics and address the question of why
administrative frictions arose when they did. I indicate executives' interests in their
political careers, party pressures and the lack of institutional channels for popular
participation in the city administration as possible explanations for the various degrees
of friction between executives and tecnicos. I conclude the chapter by analyzing the
outcome of executives' actions from the standpoint of the beneficiaries, and the
tecnicos themselves.
Executives and Tecnicos
Like other city agencies, DEMHAB has essentially four levels of workers: the
executive, who is the appointed head of the agency; the tecnicos, professionals with
university education (mainly architects, engineers, economists, lawyers and
sociologists) who deal with the technical issues and define the product of the agency;
the lower-level white-collar workers (typists, clerks, accountants); and the construction
workers (bricklayers, plumbers, electricians, carpenters) responsible for reconstruction
of removed houses, for emergency housing units and for small scale maintenance work
in the settlements under the jurisdiction of DEMHAB.
Because of the emphasis of this chapter on the relationship between executives and
tecnicos in DEMHAB, I will briefly discuss the origins of the executives in
DEMHAB, their professions, the political nature of their position and the reasons why
DEMHAB's executives have often had political ambitions. Since 1965, the
professional backgrounds of executives in DEMHAB have varied from technical areas
(architects, engineers), to business and legal (MBA's, lawyers), to the social sciences
(economists and sociologists), and even the biological sciences (medical doctors) (see
Table 6). The position of the executive is eminently political; the variety of
professionals who have headed the agency prove that the mayor's choice does not rely
primarily on professional expertise. One executive explained:
DEMHAB is a political agency. I was not re-elected for the state assembly, where
I was a representative until 1987, and so the mayor invited me to take this
position, to occupy a political space.'
Tecnicos and representatives of the community both point to DEMHAB as one of
the most politicized agencies of the municipal government:
I would say that DEMHAB has a strong presence in its settlements. I guess that it
was a presence with political objectives. DEMHAB was a very good machine for
electing its directors as city councilors. Zanella, after leaving the agency, got
11,000 votes when running for the City Council. When he was re-elected, now
without the help of DEMHAB, he got only 3,000.2
In my view, there are two reasons why DEMHAB's executives may often have
political ambitions. First, as mentioned earlier, the position has a political nature
because the mayor's choice for DEMHAB's executive is based more on confidence
and political loyalty than on technical expertise. The political appointees have often
held prior positions, and it is expected that these politicians will use the administrative
machinery to their advantage to guarantee their return to the political arena. Second,
because DEMHAB deals with highly valuable assets such as land and housing, the
potential control executives have over access to these goods gives them strong
bargaining power. Thus, besides the patronage opportunities executives have from
granting jobs, control over DEMHAB's housing units increases their opportunities for
clientelism. These two factors make DEMHAB's executive position very attractive for
both politicians and non-politicians, who may also return political support to the
mayor. These opportunities become even greater within environments that do nothing
to control these practices. It is not surprising that issues related to the control over
1Dilamar Machado, Director of DEMHAB 1981-1988, interview, 12 November 1990, Porto Alegre.
2 Heriberto Back, attorney for the Rio Grande do Sul Federation of Community Associations and
Friends of the Neighborhood, (Federagdo Riograndense das Associagoes Comunitdrias e Amigos de Bairros-
FRACAB). 1979-1985, interview, 8 November 1990, Porto Alegre.
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land purchase and the selection of applicants proved to be most prone to interference
of executives, as was the case in Phases II and III.
Beyond the levels of hierarchy, we must also be aware of the two categories of
employees in Brazilian public administrative agencies: the "confidence" positions and
the career workers. The head of the institution appoints "confidence" positions upon
taking office and they are dismissed once the head leaves office. The career workers
have entered the civil service either by merit or by patronage and remain permanently
in their positions, regardless of the change of administrations. The head of the
institution may appoint tecnicos, white-collar workers or construction workers for
"confidence" positions in their fields of activity. Their salaries are set by the
regulations of the institution and the city government. Each public institution has a
limited number of "confidence" positions. Over the years, DEMHAB has had from 15
to 30 "confidence" positions while the number of workers has ranged from 200 to 900
(see Table 12).
The Causes of Friction between Executives and Tecnicos
The frictions between executives and tecnicos in DEMHAB stemmed mainly from
two issues: 1) the criteria for the purchase of land and 2) the control over the selection
and distribution of the housing units.
Over the years, tecnicos of DEMHAB have opposed the purchase of land where
legal status was in question or where the topography was uneven.3 Most of
DEMHAB's areas have some legal problems and many of them are not physically
3 There are various levels of illegality of land in Porto Alegre. This illegality may be non-conformance
to urban regulations on land use, minimum lot area and width of the roads, or the lack of infrastructure
services, or juridical problems with inheritance processes, or borderline disputes.
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suitable for construction.4 According to some tecnicos, the direction of DEMHAB
often proceeded with the acquisition of tracts of land regardless of an opposing
technical appraisal. The final word was in the hands of the direction of the
department. Former executives explained that DEMHAB bought such areas to mediate
conflicts between private owners and invaders.
Tecnicos also complained of their eroding control over the establishment and
application of the distributive rules for the recipients of DEMHAB's lots and units
during Phases II and III, compared to Phases I and IV. According to them, the
decision-making power during the former periods shifted from the Social Division,
formally in charge of the selection of families suitable for the financing rules dictated
by BNH, to the management of the agency. Executives, however, did not
acknowledge this shift. Given the political power these two issues generate for those
who have the control over them, a more detailed analysis is necessary to unveil
possible hidden agendas. To compare more carefully tecnicos' and executives'
rationales, I will examine separately the issues of land purchase and selection criteria
over the study period.
Land Purchase
4 At the time I carried out this study, DEMHAB was undertaking a survey of the legal status of its
portfolio, given the lack of organized data. The survey had not been completed yet, but the tecnico in
charge of coordinating this task estimated that approximately 60 percent of DEMHAB's portfolio had its
legal status in question. These data refer to the legal situation of all assets managed by DEMHAB over its
lifetime, that is. both its "formal" production (projects, construction, financing and sale of units and/or lots)
and its "informal" intervention (purchase of illegal areas for future regularization). From 1952 until 1982,
DEMHAB had purchased 1,284 ha. (see Table 4).
In Phase I, from 1969 to 1975, the most significant land transaction DEMHAB
carried out was the acquisition of 142 ha. in the southern section of the city.' This
purchase did not raise conflicts between tecnicos and executives in DEMHAB, but did
create tensions between DEMHAB and the Municipal Secretary of Planning
(Secretaria do Planejamento Municipal-SPM). Tecnicos of SPM strongly opposed
using that area for a housing project because it was located on the outskirts of the city,
without infrastructure and far from city jobs. Planners thought that the project would
be very costly, because of the need to construct infrastructure lines, and that it would
impose extra commuting expenses on the residents. Despite this resistance,
DEMHAB's administration went ahead on the Nova Restinga Project, with the support
of the mayor and resources from BNH. DEMHAB's executive justified the purchase
of the land, on the basis of its low price and the agency's scarce resources.'
DEMHAB was eager to build in that region of the city because it needed to relocate
families displaced by squatter removal from the central areas of Porto Alegre. The
world and national trend in the treatment of land invasions was the relocation of
squatters to the outskirts of the cities, releasing valuable land for private enterprises.
Porto Alegre was no exception. During this period, with the slogan "Removing for
Promoting" (Remover para Promover), DEMHAB intensified the policy of squatter
removal, evicting 36,800 people, mainly from central areas of the city - 43 percent
more than in the previous five years (see Table 10).
During Phase II, according to a former executive, DEMHAB's land policy was
based on two main guidelines: 1) to buy land that had been invaded and showed a
' In 1987, the urban area of Porto Alegre was 32,745 ha. of which 41 percent was vacant. I assume that
the percentage of vacant area in 1969 was even greater. Tables 3 and 4 show the evolution of DEMHAB's
land purchases relative to the city area.
6 Norman P.Arruda, Director of DEMHAB, 1971-75, interview, 2 November 1990, Porto Alegre.
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potential for conflict between owners and squatters, and 2) to buy land adjacent to
existing invaded settlements to use for future resettlement of families displaced by
upgrading projects in these areas.7 From 1975 to 1985 the agency purchased 702.6
ha., or 35 ha. more than during its previous 22 years of existence (see Table 4).
DEMHAB's land policy resulted from BNH programs to upgrade squatters' housing
and from the greater availability of resources in the housing finance system from 1977
to 1983. Whereas executives justified their actions based on the stated criteria,
tecnicos offered different explanations. They pointed out that executives often failed
to follow technical recommendations and sometimes bought land unsuitable for
construction, favoring land owners and personal or political interests.8
During Phase III, the closure of BNH in 1986 and the suspension of various
financing programs caused a drastic reduction in DEMHAB's land purchasing. During
Phase III DEMHAB bought small pieces of land that totalled approximately 20 ha.
Tecnicos claimed ignorance about the areas DEMHAB purchased from 1986 to 1988
because executives withheld of this information. According to the tecnicos, during
Phase III executives in DEMHAB purchased land without consulting either the
Juridical and Technical Divisions or the Council of Deliberation.' They also asserted
that DEMHAB's portfolio was incomplete because of the lack of organized data
concerning those transactions. DEMHAB's executive mentioned the lack of resources
as one of the main reasons for buying small amounts of land and pointed to the
exchange of public land for private land as an alternative."
' Arthur Zanella, Director of DEMHAB, 1977-82, interview, 26 October 1990, Porto Alegre.
8 Vicente Trindade, Technical Division of DEMHAB, interview, 10 October 1990, Porto Alegre.
9 Luiz C. Bonin. Programming Division, telephone interview, 7 December 1990.
10 Dilamar Machado, Director of DEMHAB, 1987-88, interview, 12 November 1990, Porto Alegre.
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In Phase IV, tecnicos and executives, agreed on the same criteria for the purchase
of land: 1) purchase land in the eastern part of the city, both because DEMHAB had
so many settlements in the north and south of Porto Alegre, and the city could not
expand to the west because of the Guaiba River (see Fig.2); 2) buy land already
serviced by infrastructure or readily integrated into the city; and 3) purchase land
whose topography would not hinder the construction of housing settlements. Until the
date of this study, the only area that DEMHAB acquired in this period was granted by
the city administration. Frictions have not arisen because DEMHAB has not bought
any land.
Selection of Applicants
The principle for selecting families for DEMHAB's units has not changed much
from 1965. The criteria for the selection of recipients were based on the income, size
of family, and date of enrollment on the waiting list. The conditions and location of
the present dwelling and the existence of a handicapped person in the family were
criteria introduced during Phase IV. Besides these requirements, the candidates had to
be Porto Alegre residents and not own any land or housing. As an agent of BNH,
DEMHAB has followed the rules for the popular market, financing units for families
earning from 1 to 10 times the minimum wage.
The frictions between executives and tecnicos stemmed more from the violation of
the formal rules than from different ideas concerning criteria for selection. Whereas
the Social Division had the formal responsibility to establish the criteria and select
recipients for DEMHAB's units, executives had the informal power to intervene in the
process. The main instrument that DEMHAB's executives used for considering
applicants who would not fit into the established selection criteria was the "technical
reserve."
The "technical reserve" was a fraction of the total number of units of each project
that was not subject to the formal criteria of selection. Approximately 15 percent of
the production of housing units and/or lots were under the direct responsibility of
DEMHAB's executive, for him to distribute regardless of the conformity of the
rewarded applicants to the criteria of selection. The technical reserve was originally
established to flexibility and to speed up selection processes for people who would not
fit the established criteria but who deserved access to DEMHAB's units for some
reason. The technical reserve has indeed served some exceptional cases, but it has
been predominantly used for political favors. During Phases II and III, the share of
the technical reserve in the total number of units started to grow significantly and the
influence of the tecnicos on the implementation of the formal selection criteria
correspondingly decreased. Tecnicos pointed out the date of enrollment on the waiting
list and the income of the family as the criteria that executives often did not follow
when designating beneficiaries for DEMHAB's units.
Some tecnicos mentioned as one example of such practices a selection process
undertaken by the previous administration. A project initiated in Phase III and
completed in Phase IV had a large proportion of its units sold to people who enrolled
in 1988, although the waiting list in DEMHAB dates back to 1980. In general, it
appears that poor applicants received special treatment in housing because of the
political support they could provide in future elections. Another example was the
granting of access to DEMHAB's financing programs, which had lower interest rates
than those offered by the private sector, to recipients who either were above the
income ceiling or already owned a house or a piece of land. Because of the
informality of the technical reserve, it was very difficult to obtain data. Some of these
assertions about granting of favors rely on the testimony of a senior staff member who
has worked at DEMHAB since 1970."
There is, however, one indicator that may illustrate the violations of the formal
selection criteria that occurred in DEMHAB, mainly during Phases II and III. This
indicator is the percentage of DEMHAB's units sold to civil servants since 1970.
While focusing the study on the tecnicos and executives, I also had informal
conversations with the white-collar workers of DEMHAB. When asked about their
housing arrangements, many of them explained that they lived in DEMHAB's
settlements. Tecnicos confirmed that although many of DEMHAB's employees had
access to the agency's financing programs, the data were not organized adequately
enough to quantify the proportion. The Director of the Programming Division grew
interested and agreed to conduct a survey of DEMHAB's records since 1970.
The highest percentages of DEMHAB's units sold to civil servants during each
phase were the following: Phase I, 15 percent in 1975; Phase II, 50 percent in 1976
and 39 percent in 1980; Phase III, 54 percent in 1986 and 60 percent in 1987; and
Phase IV, 14 percent in 1989 (see Table 11). The data were collected from a random
sample of 28 percent of 9,238 units sold by DEMHAB since 1970. The civil servant
category included federal, state and city employees. Hence, these results do not show
the percentage of units sold to DEMHAB's employees in particular, but to civil
servants as a whole. Considering that the professional category is not a selection
criterion for DEMHAB's units and that only about 15 percent of the labor force works
11 The existence of such an informal tool, which heads of public housing agencies had used to respond
to political requests and to promote clientelistic practices, is also mentioned in Azevedo and Andrade,
Habitaco e Poder, 30.
in the public service in Brazil, this sample of 28 percent suggests abuse of the
technical reserve which may be considered excessive and atypical.
The Explanation for the Different Degrees of Friction
The friction that arose from land purchase and selection of applicants proved to
be more intense during Phases II and III than during Phases I and IV. What were the
conditions that induced executives to be more receptive to technical recommendations
and to act within the established rules in Phases I and IV? Why did Phases II and III
present a higher degree of friction between executives and tecnicos? My argument is
that the explanation for these questions lies in the conjunction of two factors: 1) the
personal political ambitions of DEMHAB's executives along with pressures that other
actors -- community organizations, political parties, city administration, and economic
groups -- may have exerted on the implementation of DEMHAB's policies; and 2) the
existence or lack of institutional channels for the popular participation at a city level.
When comparing Phase I, which embodied a conservative party within a military
and authoritarian regime, with Phase IV, which represented a progressive party within
a democratic regime, another puzzling question arose: why did two administrations
that represented contrasting political agendas have similar procedures? The military
governments have, after all, repressed the grassroots movements and the exercise of
representative democracy, squeezed salaries and widened the already wide inequality
of income in the country, and spread the practice of back-door decision-making in the
name of a development strategy and national security.' 2
12 For a detailed analysis of the military regime post 1964, see Thomas E. Skidmore, The Politics of
Military Rule in Brazil, 1964-85 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988).
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To understand this contradiction, we need to step back and place DEMHAB and
Porto Alegre in a national and historical context. In 1964, the regime installed by a
military coup adopted a model of authoritarian bureaucracy for the implementation of
public policies. This model defines a regime where the military and civil bureaucracy
sustained a dictatorship in power to implement a modernizing program aimed at rapid
economic growth. The system operated through a strong centralization of decision-
making mechanisms, restricting the channels of participation of society. In this model,
the bureaucracy and not the political party constituted the linkage between civil society
and the state. Policy making included rational decision-making processes, where
highly trained administrators decided on technical matters.13  The regime installed in
1964, therefore, perceived the housing problem as a technical matter. The answer for
a technical problem would be the optimal combination of factors within a politically
neutral solution.'4
In Phase I, there were several reasons executives made decisions by the rules,
particularly in the selection of applicants. First, executives applied the bureaucratic-
authoritarian model in a very efficient way in DEMHAB. In this model, technical
appraisal had a significant role in the implementation of policies, so that DEMHAB's
executives were more receptive to tecnicos' recommendations. An appropriate
selection of borrowers and adequate projects would guarantee the achievement of the
original goals of providing housing for the poor and, at the same time, sustaining the
system of financing the units. The principle for selecting families for the new houses
was "the right home for the right family," which stressed the criteria of income and
13 On the role of technocrats, see Richard Batley, Power through Bureaucracy- Urban Political Analysis
in Brazil (New York: St. Martins Press, 1983); Cardoso, "Associated Dependent Development"; and Barry
Ames, Rhetoric and Reality in a Militarized Regime: Brazil since 1964 (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1973).
" Azevedo and Andrade, Habitacao e Poder 57.
size of the family. This philosophy was based upon the idea that an appropriate
selection would avoid high default rates, thus ensuring cost recovery and replicability
of the system. This concern was strong because of the previous experience of
COHABs--DEMHAB's counterparts in the BNH structure--in other cities and states.
As cited in Chapter One, the COHABs experienced a substantial decline during the
1970-75 period, mainly caused by high default rates. The success of housing projects
was very important as a means to legitimize the military regime among poor
Brazilians.
A second factor that helped executives to stick by the rules was that executives
suffered less pressure from politicians to use the technical reserve to provide special
favors of access to DEMHAB's units. This was because the housing deficit and
demand for units was much smaller in this period. In 1965 the housing deficit was
only around 13,500 units; fifteen years later it jumped to almost 41,000 (see Table 1).
In addition, the lack of electoral interest by the head of the agency would not have
motivated him to sponsor clientelistic practices in exchange for political support.
Contrary to executives of Phases II and III, who ran, and were elected for the City
Council, executives of Phase I did not run for any elected position after leaving the
agency (see Table 6).
In Phase I, the administration stressed the bureaucratic component of the regime,
creating conditions for a more institutional environment. This institutionalization,
though, was imposed and depended more upon the political willingness of DEMHAB's
executives than on a consolidated principle of public policy. Because there were no
channels for social control over the political realm, the institutional practices did not
survive the change in administration, which brought back clientelistic practices.
Changes in DEMHAB's administration during Phases II and III were caused not only
by the shift of mayors and parties, but also by executives who resigned to run for
elections. Three of DEMHAB's executives were elected for the City Council after
leaving office (see Table 6). Their interests in a subsequent political career may have
stimulated the exchange of favors, such as the access to housing, for the exchange of
political support. The highest percentages of DEMHAB's units sold to civil servants
appeared during these two phases, 50 percent in 1976, and 60 percent in 1987 (see
Table 11). Along with these electoral interests, there were no institutional channels
of direct popular participation, which could have acted to oppose these practices.
These circumstances, however, changed during Phase IV.
Two factors contributed to the conditions that caused executives to act within the
rules in Phase IV. First, the administration, which represented an underprivileged and
excluded segment of society, was committed to guarantee democratic access to urban
services for its constituents. The administration that supported respect for the
established selection criteria for DEMHAB's units enhanced democratic access to
housing. Second, the existence since 1990 of new institutional mechanisms of popular
representation at the city level, such as the Popular and Municipal Councils, gave the
grassroots movements channels for participating in the formulation and implementation
of public policies. These channels have enabled community organizations to exert
closer control on the actions and policies carried out by the city government and its
agencies, thus making it more difficult for executives to carry out actions outside the
institutional rules. Whether DEMHAB's present executive will run for an elected
position is unclear, but she has shown a political willingness to act within the
institutional rules and to follow tecnicos' recommendations.
The Outcomes of Frictions between Executives and Tecnicos
During most of the period analyzed in this study, the executives' decisions about
land purchase and the selection of applicants for DEMHAB's units have neither
followed institutional rules nor technical recommendations. This fact raises further
questions: Who benefitted from these decisions, and what effects did they have on the
unfolding of DEMHAB's policies?; How can technical decisions and political
responsiveness be reconciled in the implementation of public policies? In analyzing
separately land purchase and selection of applicants in DEMHAB, I will address these
questions.
In the Land Purchase
In the case of an institution that deals mainly with the construction of low-cost
housing, the provision of serviced plots, and the implementation of upgrading projects,
land purchase has proven to be one of the most controversial issues. During Phase I,
the purchase of 142 hectares in the southern section of the city, despite tecnicos'
disagreement, because of the lack of infrastructure and distance from more densely
populated areas, proved to have a long-term positive outcome. Because of its size, it
allowed DEMHAB to utilize the area for various projects at different periods of time.
It also formed a small land bank in times of scarce resources for the acquisition of
land.
During Phase II, the stated criteria for the purchase of invaded land, namely the
avoidance of conflicts between squatters and landowners and the proximity to other
invaded areas, raised the question of whose interests DEMHAB's executives were
really representing. On one hand, DEMHAB's purchase of invaded areas benefitted
the dwellers, ensuring they would not be evicted from their homes. On the other
hand, these purchases certainly benefitted landowners, who found a buyer for their
devalued land. While the land purchases may have appeared to benefit both sides,
closer examination suggests that more study is needed to uncover the reasons for these
purchases. First, often these areas often proved to be highly problematic in terms of
their topographic conditions, their non-conformance to housing uses within the urban
regulations, and their legal status. From a technical standpoint, these areas were not
appropriate for purchasing. Second, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, when
DEMHAB bought a large amount of land, the emergent organization of grassroots
movements had not yet gained effective influence on the implementation of public
policies because of a still strong repressive state apparatus. Third, the conservative
party in power represented the interests of an elite, and did not favor the poorer
segments of society.
What, then, was driving executives to buy such areas? The answer may lie in the
pressure landowners may have exerted on the city and DEMHAB's administration to
buy these tracts of land, offering in exchange political support. This hypothesis,
however has yet to be tested. A detailed survey of the conditions of those areas,
market values and prices paid by DEMHAB, as well as the political and economic
positions of the owners may reveal a hidden agenda. This study along with a survey
of the level of organization of the dwellers and their political power may suggest that
the stated criteria for the purchase of land were a product not only of pressure of
dwellers, but also of other segments of society. The same procedure helps us
understand the actions during Phase III.
I judge the effects of buying problematic invaded land in two ways. First, these
areas delay in the already lengthy process of upgrading. These delays raise costs,
jeopardizing both beneficiaries and the institution. Second, in buying such areas, the
public sector transfers the total costs of urbanization to the state, exempting the private
sector from the burden of retaining devalued land and of implementing the required
infrastructure to subdivide and sell the plots to the dwellers. When buying invaded or
illegal land the state should seek alternatives to incorporate into the transaction costs
of providing services and/or sharing expenditures with the private sector.
Selection of Applicants
The violation of the rules for the selection of applicants may have benefitted
executives and those rewarded with the units, but it unquestionably hurt the large
majority of applicants and the work of tecnicos and civil servants in general.
Applicants were affected in their right to access benefits, tecnicos and civil servants in
the credibility of their work.
In Brazil, it is commonplace for citizens to criticize public service as heavily
bureaucratized, inefficient and corrupt. Some studies also mention the predominance
of political patronage over merit standards in the selection of employees.15 The
distance between bureaucracy and civil society during the military rule contributed to
the building of this image. However, the process of redemocratization that Brazil
experienced in the late 1980s revived the discussion about institution building and the
role of civil service as an instrument, among others, for the consolidation of the new
democratic regime. Public administration was no longer a matter of authoritarian
decisions and distant bureaucrats, but a subject of interest for many sectors of society,
which constituted an important part of the new institutional environment. The
participation of the organized segments of society in the previously inaccessible public
1 Lawrence Graham, Civil Service in Brazil- Principles versus Practice (Austin: University of Texas
Press, 1968) 125.
institutions would also combat clientelistic practices that had long permeated the
public agencies. In this context, respecting professional responsibilities and following
institutional procedures played a very important role in the search for competence and
efficiency within public institutions.
As a concluding remark, I point out the danger of falling into the other extreme,
that is, overvaluing the fulfillment of rules and standards and strict technical
procedures in the process of decision-making and implementation of projects in the
public sector. DEMHAB, as an agency that deals with the provision of low-income
housing and the implementation of upgrading projects, has faced controversies related
to urban standards and regulations along with scarce resources to solve an enormous
variety of problems. The controversies mainly involved the size of lots and width of
roads in upgrading projects. Whereas other city agencies operated within the formal
city, DEMHAB mainly administered the informal city (land invasions and illegal
settlements). This condition raised the dilemma of DEMHAB's working with
standards that many times conflict with the resources available and the beneficiaries'
capacity to pay for such standards. Some tecnicos in DEMHAB have recognized the
need to review the standards that do not correspond to the social reality and needs, so
that DEMHAB may more effectively intervene in the provision of low-income housing
in Porto Alegre. 16
Internal Appraisal Report, DEMIHAB, April, 1990.
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CHAPTER THREE
CONTINUITY OF PROJECTS IN DEMHAB
EVOLUTION OF DEMHAB, 1965-1990
.Period .Regime .Executives .Community Interaction
.Party and Tecicos
.PHASE I .Bureaucratic- .less friction .Antagonism
1965/75 Authoritarian no community interaction
.Conservative-PDS 
.no empowerment
.PHASE II .Bureaucratic- .more friction 
.Limited Acceptance
1976/85 Authoritarian 
.community interaction
.Conservative- PDS 
.no empowerment
.PHASE III .Democratic .more friction +$ W .Acceptance
1986/88 .Populist-PDT di2.community interaction
.empowerment
.PHASE IV .Democratic .less friction ... .Support
1989/90 .Progressive-PT ~:~.comfmunity interaction
.. more empowerment
In this chapter, I explain why DEMHAB had a high degree of continuity of
projects through different administrations. I argue that the intertwining of the building
process and the funding process caused this continuity. The characteristics of a built
product as the result of the agency's policies made DEMHAB's projects less
vulnerable to disruption. The relationship between the permanence of executives in
DEMHAB, and the time taken for construction did not encourage the suspension of
projects. The destination of funds in early stages of the building and funding
processes, however, allowed executives to slow down certain projects in favor of
others, causing an interruption in time, but not a total disruption in the project's
execution. As stated by DEMHAB 's tecnicos, after getting the resources, the projects
go by inertia, they go by themselves. I believe that the projects "own life" is closely
related to their "independence" from "DEMHAB's employees life". Because
DEMHAB's employees have their salaries guaranteed regardless of resources and/or
completion of the projects, the projects become quasi-autonomous entities. Their
completion mostly depends on the efficiency of the bureaucracy at a local and national
level, the priority is given by the direction of the agency, and the availability of
resources. The closure of BNH in 1986 had an impact on the continuity of projects: it
stopped construction because of lack of funds. This paralyzation caused delays, but
not disruption. The projects initiated in Phase III have been completed during Phase
IV.
I divide this chapter into three sections. In the first section, I describe the concept
of continuity used in this study. In the second section I explain the continuity of
projects in DEMHAB. In this section I focus on the building process and the
differences between new construction and upgrading projects in terms of phases, time
for completion, and funding sources. I also analyze the funding process: the
destination of resources in relation to stages of project implementation; DEMHAB's
role within the city government; and the relationship between different funding sources
for distinct project components. In the final section, I discuss the reasons for less
continuity during Phase III. I address the executive's political interests and the closure
of BNH as causes for this discontinuity.
Continuity of Projects
The degree of continuity of DEMHAB projects refers to two aspects: continuity
over time and continuity of project characteristics. Continuity over time may
encompass higher or lower paces of implementation, but the final result is completion
of the project. The causes of varying paces may be particular characteristics of the
project or caused by emphasis on completion by executives. I view a project as
having continuity if it was completed.
Continuity in the characteristics of the project refers to the degree of changes in
the original design. Projects whose final result are a built entity involve some
alterations, because of surprises that may arise during the construction process.
Unexpected physical conditions and lack of materials and tools are some factors that
cause changes. Changes may also arise earlier, during the design stage.
Transformations in the design stage, however, may result in a radically different
product. I consider a project continuous if it was not changed conceptually.
The strong continuity of projects across administrations was one of the initial
puzzles that sustained my eagerness to understand the dynamics of DEMHAB. One
possible explanation was that for 20 years it had been ruled by the same party, PDS,
so that there was little pressure to cover up the accomplishments of earlier
administrations to consolidate a new party program. But the changes of administration
within the same party could have caused disruption, because of executives' interests in
differentiating their administrations from previous ones. In fact, this was not the case.
The Nova Restinga Project is the most striking example of continuity. Because of its
size (3,800 units) and division into four sequential phases, the construction of the
original project lasted for 11 years (1969-1980) and passed through three different
administrations.1
Almost all phases in DEMHAB showed a substantial degree of project continuity,
both in time and in characteristics, with the exception of Phase III. During this phase,
changes in the characteristics of some projects caused discontinuity. The closure of
BNH caused delays in the pace of implementation but did not cause disruption.
A detailed description of the Nova Restinga Project is given in Appendix B.
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The Explanation for the Continuity of Projects
The high degree of continuity of projects across different administrations in
DEMHAB was mainly caused by the intertwining of the building and funding
processes. The permanence of the same party ruling DEMHAB during 20 years also
contributed to this continuity. In the building process, the length, cost and phases of
construction along with the bureaucratic steps to release loans caused this continuity.
In the funding process, the causes for continuity of projects in DEMHAB included the
following: i) the destination of funds in the projects' early stages; ii) DEMHAB's role
within the municipal government as an instrument for extra resources; iii) the division
between the city and BNH for the funding of different components of the projects,
namely salaries and construction costs, and; iv) the opportunities which incomplete
projects offered to executives and politicians to promote patronage.
The Building Process
In this study I argue that the fragmentation of the building process in different
and sequential phases is one the causes for the continuity of projects in DEMHAB
through various administrations. The fragmentation in the building process is
expressed by the division of the process into phases of design and construction, by the
involvement of various professions, and by the use of multiple materials and tools.
I divide the building process into six main phases: 1) Program -- identification of
needs and services to be provided by a building or a set of buildings; 2) Design --
translation of these needs into a technical language and physical plan; 3) Design
Review -- review and approval of the design by the city authorities; 4) Construction --
hiring of contractors and the construction itself; 5) Approval for the Certificate of
Occupancy -- establishment of conformance of the built product to the building codes
and urban regulations; 6) Building Registration -- registration of the building at the
Registry of Deeds, for which all legal requirements about the participating institutions
must be established.
DEMHAB deals with two types of projects: new construction projects and
urbanization projects. New construction projects are the projects built on vacant land.
This category includes "sites and services" projects, detached housing and walk-up
buildings. Urbanization projects are the projects implemented on occupied land, aimed
at the legalization of the area and the security of the dwellers. They consist of the
installation of infrastructure, services; and may or may not include the construction of
the housing unit.
Both types of projects have different characteristics that affect their building
process, and therefore have different phases and time required for their completion.
According to tecnicos involved in the design and implementation of projects in
DEMHAB, the average time for construction of new projects ranges from three to four
years -- completion of new construction of similar projects in the private sector takes
approximately two years.2 Implementation of urbanization projects ranges from five
to six years. In Appendix B I provide a detailed description of both types of projects.
New Construction Projects In the case of new construction projects two more
steps are added to the existing six phases of the construction process: the initial
negotiations with the financial source, and project approval by the bank for the release
of the loan. The initial negotiations with the bank take place in the beginning of the
process. After defining the types of projects, DEMHAB's tecnicos send the
preliminary design to BNH. The bank examines the projects and includes them in the
2 Luiz Carlos Bonin, Programming Division of DEMHAB, interview, 22 October 1990, Porto Alegre.
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credit line. The inclusion of the project in the credit line is the first of a two-step
process of approval. After this initial approval, the release of the loan is usually a
matter of course.
The approval of the projects by the bank happens after the design review. In
addition to the technical conformance of projects to city regulations, finances of the
institution and the city government have to be in "healthy" conditions. If any of the
city departments, including DEMHAB, should have debts with the federal government
regarding the FGTS, no loan will be released. These rigorous measures were
implemented after the closure of BNH and as a result of the new composition of the
Council of Deliberation of the FGTS.3 This second step ends with the signature of a
contract between DEMHAB and BNH, guaranteeing the destination of funds for the
project. These two phases account for at least six months each, adding one whole
year to the already lengthy process.
Urbanization Projects Urbanization projects are even longer and more
complicated processes. The requirements are similar to the new construction projects,
whereas the conditions for the implementation and construction are very different.
Besides the steps described previously, the urbanization projects have to deal with: 1)
adverse and changing physical conditions; 2) the time lag between approval of the
projects and release of the loans; 3) the resistance of tecnicos to work on this type of
project; and 4) the inadequacy of existing urban standards for urbanization projects.
1) Adverse and changing physical conditions: The dwellings are usually settled on
steep slopes or lowlands subject to floods. These tough topographic conditions make
3 As a result of the new Federal Constitution approved in 1988, the Council of Deliberation of the
FGTS, that administers and decides about the uses and allocation of resources of the fund for the
construction of low-income housing in the country, has two representatives of two National Labor Unions,
among its seven members. Gladimiro M. Dantas, Financial Division of DEMHAB, interview, 6 November
1990, Porto Alegre.
the survey work necessary to locate and legalize the individual lots difficult. The
great mobility and instability of these settlements adds to these problems. By the time
the work begins, the situation may have changed, families have moved out, others
have moved in and the configuration of the area may be totally different. The old
design no longer fits the conditions. The projects have to be redesigned by planners to
suit the new circumstances. These changes cause delays and waste resources.
2) Time lag between approval of projects and release of loans: The time lag
between approval of projects and release of loans in an inflationary environment, as
exists in Brazil, erodes the allocated resources and threatens the completion of the
original project. In addition, squatter areas tend to become denser as time passes.
Delays in the release of loans, shrinkage of resources and the increase of potential
beneficiaries may jeopardize the implementation of the upgrading project.
3) The resistance of tecnicos to work in urbanization projects: The involvement of
the tecnicos is very important to the progress of upgrading projects, because of the
characteristics of such projects. Normally professionals who work in the civil service,
particularly engineers and architects, are used to regular work hours, which do not
include activities at night and during weekends that are often necessary in those types
of projects. The resolution of conflicts and activities of community organizations that
upgrading projects often require, have neither been a part of their previous professional
education, nor of what they see as their responsibilities.4
4) Inadequacy of existing urban standards for urbanization projects: Urbanization
projects, despite their goal of maintaining the original population in the area, often
involve some degree of displacement. The upgrading and addition of roads and the
' On the role of the tecnico, particularly in self-help projects, see Eduardo N. Vieira, "Quando o Poder
Pdblico Promove a Auto-construgdo ou o Mutirao," in 0 Rio Grande do Sul Urbano, Naia Oliveira and
Tanya Barcellos, eds. (Porto Alegre: FEE, 1990), 73.
subdivision in lots causes houses to be moved and relocated elsewhere in the same
area, or, if there is not enough land, outside the settlement. The urban regulations
establishing sizes of lots, width of roads, land use and building setbacks have proven
to be inadequate to the characteristics of urbanization projects. The Master Plan of
Porto Alegre determines 125 m2 as the minimum lot area and 12 m as the minimum
road width. If these standards were relaxed, the number of displaced families could be
lowered. Narrower roads, for example, would release land for a larger number of lots.
Lots with smaller area would allow more families to remain in the settlement.
Over the years, DEMHAB has changed these standards by using different kinds of
land tenure, such as horizontal condominiums. In the horizontal condominium, people
do not own individual lots, but rather a fraction of the whole area and have the right
of using all the common areas. The Master Plan allows lower urban standards for
streets (6 m) and plots (108 m2) in this kind of project, because of the increase of
common areas. The reason DEMHAB has used this solution is not only because of
the possibility of maintaining more people in the same area but also because of their
limited ability to pay for larger plots.
The phases of the building process have proven to be lengthy and costly in
DEMHAB. As said earlier, the average time for completion of projects in the public
sector is greater than in the private sector. DEMHAB's projects have not been behind
schedule, but followed the average of public sector projects. The long time taken for
the implementation of public projects, either new construction or urbanization, has
often exceeded the time executives stay in their positions. Tecnicos and former and
present directors of DEMHAB agreed on both the expected and unexpected difficulties
of completing projects and their unwillingness to stop projects. This approach is
explained by possible advantages that accompany ongoing projects. First, the political
propaganda that the completion of a project brings along with it, even if it was not
initiated by the same administration, is very appealing for executives and politicians.
Second, the guaranteed allocation of resources that accompany ongoing projects may
be utilized for the distribution of patronage by the incoming administration either
through the granting of job positions or through the facilitation of access as recipients
of DEMHAB's units. Whereas these first two reasons apply for executives seeking
particular electoral support and political recognition, what would explain the continuity
of projects when executives do not have these aspirations? A third factor answers this
question. In the case of an agency whose main activity is the construction of low-
income housing, the suspension of ongoing projects might cause an image of
backwardness and immobilization of the agency, which is politically undesirable.
Phase IV's executive indeed confirmed this assertion. When asked about her first
actions after taking office in DEMHAB, she pointed out the undertaking of a
reevaluation of all the ongoing projects as a mistake. This reassessment process
almost paralyzed the activities of the agency.
The Funding Process
In the previous section, I showed how the building process related to the funding
process through the interdependence of phases of construction and release of funds. In
this section I will focus on the guarantee of fund allocation in the early phases of a
project; on DEMHAB's role in bringing resources to the city government; and on the
independence of salary costs from project funding as reasons for the continuity of
projects across administrations in DEMHAB.
Since 1969, when DEMHAB entered the Housing Finance System (SFH), the
agency has relied heavily on federal resources to implement its projects. As a
regulator of SFH, BNH established general rules for the system, including conditions
for mortgages and deposits, reserve requirements and interest rates. Given this
relationship, the conditions of DEMHAB's loans for construction and subsequent
finance for the residents have been dictated by BNH. Since 1986, loan conditions
have been regulated by the Federal Savings Bank (CEF). Once the resources were
allocated for a particular project in the negotiation phase with the bank, the funds were
guaranteed, and it depended on the agency to conduct a speedy process to release the
loans.
This process, though, could take years, as the case of the "Vila Pinto Project,"
which was included in the "credit line" in 1983 but did not have its loan released until
1990. The withdrawal of BNH resources from urbanization projects starting in 1983,
the closure of the bank in 1986, and the hesitance of DEMHAB's executives to tackle
a very problematic area may explain the deferral of the project. Despite all these
factors, the project that began in Phase II was completed during Phase IV. There are
also examples of projects that experienced shorter and less troubled processes. Yet
changes in administration did not disrupt such projects. In the case of DEMHAB, the
guarantee of the allocation of funds in early stages of the process facilitated the
continuity of projects across various administrations. Another factor that supported the
continuity of projects in DEMHAB was the agency's capacity to obtain resources for
the city government through the access to BNH loans. This access is not possible for
other municipal secretaries, because of the structure of the city administration. The
city administration is divided into direct and indirect administration. The direct
administration contains the mayor's cabinet and the Municipal secretaries. The
indirect administration contains the autarquias- independent authorities- foundations,
and public and private enterprises that are maintained by the city government. The
direct and indirect administrations have separate budgets. Whereas the secretaries are
included in the municipal budget, DEMHAB, as part of the indirect administration, is
not. The city government only covers the payroll of DEMHAB's employees. Because
DEMHAB is an autarquia, an independent department, it can take out loans with the
collateral secured by the city government. That is why; for example, DEMHAB could
get loans from BNH for the implementation of infrastructure, while the Municipal
Secretary of Roads and Works could not. These funds, which were used to implement
and improve services, released the burden of maintenance costs from other municipal
secretaries. The Nova Restinga Project, financed by BNH, included a power sub-
station and a water main that benefitted not only the area of the project but the
adjacent land as well.
DEMHAB's projects represented an extra flow of resources that indirectly were
utilized by the city as a whole. These resources have been, and still are, very large.
An illustration of the significance of these funds is the relationship between the 1991
budget of the city government for the implementation of roads and DEMHAB's
budget for a single project. Whereas the municipality allocated 400 million cruzeiros
for the construction of roads in 1991, DEMHAB had 200 million cruzeiros for the
same purpose in just one of its projects.! The city government, thus, had a strong
interest in showing BNH good results, through the completion of projects, as a support
for future loans. Besides the material advantages, mayors receive political gains
through the image of dynamism and entrepreneurship generated by so many
accomplishments.
A third factor contributing to the continuity of projects in DEMHAB is the
separation between salary funding and project funding. As stated earlier, the
o Lires Marques, Director of DEMHAB, 1989/..., interview, 12 November 1990, Porto Alegre.
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municipality covers the payroll of DEMHAB's employees. A six percent
administrative tax charged over all the projects financed by BNH covers the
maintenance and operating costs of the agency. Because salaries do not depend on
BNH's funds, executives in DEMHAB have not faced the dilemma of cutting back on
project investments to protect salaries in case of reduction or delays in funding.
In an evaluation about rural projects in Brazil, Tendler mentions the linkage
between operating costs and capital-intensive costs as a factor contributing to the
disruption of projects. In the case of project funding shortfalls, project managers
would prefer to cut back on investments than to bear the political and social
consequences of cutting back on salaries. The case of DEMHAB, which had its
payroll financed by the municipal government and its projects financed by BNH (later
by CEF), corroborates the hypothesis that different sources of funding for salaries and
project construction and investments may improve the implementation of projects.
The funding process proved to have facilitated the implementation of projects,
stimulating their continuity across administrations. The guarantee of funding in early
stages of the project, the ability of DEMHAB to complement the scarce municipal
resources, and the division of funding between city and federal governments, for
salaries and project costs respectively, stimulated DEMHAB's executives and city
mayors to carry out ongoing projects. It was not visible, thus enhanced their
willingness to block the unfolding of projects in DEMHAB over the years. The
projects represented sources of funds for the city administration and there was no
interest in interrupting them. Eventual delays were due to the bureaucracy involved in
their execution, and/or to the lack of resources of the financing source, rather than to a
6 Judith Tendler, "Northeast Brazil Rural Development Evaluation" (Cambridge, Draft, December,
1989), 52-59.
political unwillingness to carry them out. According to the present director of
Programming of DEMHAB, there is no project in DEMHAB, with allocated resources,
which has been suspended in the last four administrations of the city, that is, since
1970.7
Why less Continuity in Phase Il?
Executive's Actions
During Phase III there was less continuity of projects in DEMHAB. The
executive's direct interference along with community pressures caused two projects to
be conceptually modified. These projects had been approved by the previous
administration. The "Vila da Pascoa Project" had its design changed from walk-up
buildings to sites and services. The "Fraternidade Project" had a site that had been
previously reserved for a park subdivided into lots. When interviewed, DEMHAB's
executive of Phase III did not mention changes in these particular projects. Because
this was information given by tecnicos when interviewed, and I did not have the
opportunity to examine these projects in more detail, I have very few elements to draw
conclusions about the reasons for these transformations. It appears, however, that
political reasons drove the executive's decision for the changes. In both cases, the
adopted solution accommodated more people, thus increasing the opportunities for
clientelistic practices in the granting of access to the units.
The impact of BNH closure
The previous section showed the close relationship between DEMHAB and BNH.
This section will briefly discuss the closure of BNH and DEMHAB's responses to the
7 Luiz Carlos Bonin, Programming Division of DEMHAB, telephone interview, 20 December 1990.
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new circumstances. Not only had the national economic context changed with the
consolidation of a recession and skyrocketing inflation, but the political environment
of the city and DEMHAB had also changed. In 1985 there were free elections for the
city government for the first time, since the military coup in 1964. The victory of
PDT, a populist party, did not change the clientelistic practices of Phase II, but it did
open some channels for the institutionalization of community participation in the
making and implementation of policies in the city through the Popular Councils and
through the implementation of self-help projects. These projects were, indeed,
DEMHAB's response to the growing scarcity of resources for low-income housing
provided by the Federal government since the closure of BNH in 1986.
DEMHAB depended upon BNH resources to carry out its programs. Any change
in the national economy would directly affect DEMHAB. The recession which began
in the early 1980s eroded BNH's main resources of funds for low-income housing and
affected the housing production of DEMHAB as well. Nevertheless, the impact of this
erosion did not show up in the indicators until 1985 at the earliest.8 Table 7 shows
the drastic drop of DEMHAB's production, from 1,924 units in 1985 to 96 in 1986.
In 1983, the cutbacks in resources affected DEMHAB through the slowdown and
suspension of some projects. In 1987, DEMHAB had to stop the construction of
approximately 150 units.
The economic crisis also affected private banks and construction firms. Housing
Companies, such as COHAB-RS, contracted with private companies for the
construction of their projects. Hence, the bankruptcy of a regional bank and local
construction firms heavily affected COHAB, DEMHAB's counterpart at the state level.
In 1987, COHAB had nearly 11,500 incomplete units in the Metropolitan Area of
8 Vetter, Financing National Investment Programs, 37.
64
Porto Alegre. On some of these projects construction had been dormant since 1983.
Private firms had approximately 2,000 low-income housing units paralyzed. The
majority of the incomplete units were located in the cities of Alvorada and Canoas,
and some in Porto Alegre. During 1987, low-income families invaded a total of
almost 14,000 incomplete units in the Metropolitan Region of Porto Alegre. This
invasion of incomplete units belonging to public and private sector was the first time
in the country's history.' Considering the number of COHAB's and DEMHAB's
incomplete units, the impact of the economic crisis and BNH closure in DEMHAB
was relatively small. The major part of DEMHAB's invaded units were sold to the
squatters and had their construction completed subsequently.
Since the closure of BNH in 1986, CEF has not released resources for the
acquisition of land. The effect of this sharp cutback in funding has been a more
"local" alternative for the buying of new areas and an emphasis on self-help projects.
The local approach was translated through the use of legislative and urban control
instruments to obtain resources to finance the purchase of land for low-income
housing.10 This device has also been used by DEMHAB during Phase IV. The new
city constitution, approved in 1990, included other legislative instruments that should
provide resources for the implementation of low-income housing in the city.
9 Marta P. Ghezzi, Glenda P. Cruz and Eduardo N. Vieira, "Aspetti Politici e Tecnologici della
Questione Abitativa Brasiliana," in Tecnologie per lo Sviluppo Urbano e Suburbano (Faenza: E.A. Fiere di
Bologna, 1987); COHAB, "A COHAB que Recebemos- Relat6rio 1987" (Porto Alegre: COHAB, 1988).
10 These legislative instruments are known as "indices sale." The "indices sale" is the sale of the right
to build more in areas adjacent or under the radial influence of zones that have less density than it was
foreseen by the Master Plan of the city. For example , when the city government establishes areas of parks,
it is in reality, not allowing anything to be built in that area, lowering the density of that section. The city,
thus, can sell to other public agencies or private enterprises the right to build the corresponding volume of
construction in a neighboring area. Fifty percent of the money generated by this transaction is used for the
implementation of the Master Plan, which includes the acquisition of land for the provision of low-income
housing.
The continuity of projects was a positive aspect of DEMHAB. It avoided the
conspicuousness of incomplete construction and the waste of public resources. This
continuity portrayed an example that contradicts the image of inefficiency that city and
public administrations have in developing countries. It showed, however, that if
continuity happens, it is not because of enlightened principles of politicians and
executives for the public good, but because it serves explicit political goals.
CHAPTER FOUR
COMMUNITY INTERACTION IN DEMHAB
EVOLUTION OF DEMHAB- 1965/1990
.Period .Regime .Executives .Continuity of
.Party and Tecnicos Projects .
.PHASE I .Bureaucratic- .less friction .continuity - u
1965/75 Authoritarian
.Conservative-PDS
.PHASE II .Bureaucratic- .more friction .continuity ............
1976/85 Authoritarian
.Conservative-PDS
.PHASE III .Democratic .more friction .less continuity
1986/88 .Populist-PDT .BNH closure . ..
.PHASE IV .Democratic .less friction .continuity
1989/90 .Progressive-PT
This chapter discusses the evolution of DEMHAB's interaction with the
community over the last 25 years. From 1965 through 1990, the response of the city
government in Porto Alegre to the growing number of settlements on invaded areas
has shifted from antagonism, to acceptance, and finally to support. Parallel to this
trend, DEMHAB's interactions with its recipients evolved from top-down to bottom-up
approaches. I define the interaction of DEMHAB with the community as the
mechanisms that the institution uses to involve the target population in policy making
and project implementation, and the decision-making power of communities within the
various phases of this process. The authoritarian and personalistic style that prevailed
during Phases I and II gave place to a more democratic, but still individual approach
in Phase III. Not until Phase IV did this interaction involve representative
participation of both recipients and DEMHAB employees.
In discussing the changes in DEMHAB's attitudes, I address the following
questions: Why did the agency's attitude toward community participation in the
planning process change? What impacts did these changes have on the
implementation of DEMHAB's policies and on the dynamics of the institution? To
answer these questions, I have divided the chapter into three sections, covering the
periods of antagonism, acceptance and support. In each section I depict DEMHAB's
actions, explain the reasons for DEMHAB's undertaking such actions, and identify the
reflections of each approach on the levels of community participation and on the
structural organization of DEMHAB.
Antagzonism - Phase I
During Phase I, DEMHAB centered its actions on the implementation of the
national housing policy. Squatter removal and relocation were important parts of this
policy. The policies of squatter removal in Brazil date back to 1947, when the federal
government created the Commission for the Eradication of Favelas. The creation of
BNH and the centralization of resources and policies enabled the regime to implement
a nationwide removal program. From 1965 to 1975 DEMHAB removed 14,400 units,
corresponding to 62,800 people. Squatter removal took place in those areas with
valuable land. Downtown areas were cleared up, as well as some pockets of invaded
land along important avenues linking neighborhoods to the central area of the city.
Despite the removals, the squatter population kept increasing. Whereas in 1965 the
squatters in Porto Alegre totaled 65,600 people, and accounted for 8 percent of the
city population, in 1973 these figures jumped to 105,800 and 11 percent, respectively
(see Table 1).
The series of evictions carried out by DEMHAB during this period required an
immediate solution for the placement of the dwellers. The Nova Restinga Project
would house the evicted families and shift 20 percent of the population of an adjacent
settlement, Restinga Velha, which was used as a transitional area between the
evictions and the final destination of the families. The Nova Restinga Project
embodied the national housing policy in the social interest. The goals were to
implement infrastructure and build 3,867 housing units in three years. The Nova
Restinga Project was DEMHAB's first project to be financed by BNH in Porto
Alegre.
Besides the Nova Restinga Project, the agency concentrated its actions on the
upgrading of older DEMHAB settlements. This upgrading program was implemented
on the agency's land and not on invaded or illegal settlements. DEMHAB's policy
during the 1950s had provided low-cost housing on unserviced plots, as a way to
lower costs for the agency and its recipients. With the advent of the National Housing
Bank and DEMHAB's incorporation into the housing finance system, the
administration during Phase I requested and obtained resources from BNH for the
upgrading of DEMHAB's own areas. This was a fairly innovative action, since
upgrading programs at a national level had not started until 1979.
During this period, the policy of DEMHAB did not involve any community
participation. It followed the rule of the regime: concentration of power and
technocratic practices. The city government and DEMHAB had the decision-making
power regarding the choice of the areas to be cleared and the ones to be upgraded.
During a time of strong political repression, the elites in power considered the
organization of the poorer segments of society a serious threat to the stability of the
regime. Thus any attempted resistance was bound to fail. The authoritarian and
repressive apparatus, which supported the military dictatorship, not only had
discouraged negotiation, but also had crushed earlier attempts of resistance by squatter
populations in other cities such as Rio de Janeiro and Sio Paulo.
The internal structure of DEMHAB did not undergo major changes during this
period. Along with the Direction, there were two main divisions, the Technical
Division and the Financial and Administrative Division, and three Sectors directly
linked to the Direction of DEMHAB, namely the Juridical Sector, the Social Sector
and the Planning and Programming Sector. The interaction between DEMHAB and the
dwellers, particularly in the squatter removal process, was done through the work of
officials of the Social Sector, who conducted surveys to identify and relocate dwellers
in temporary sites before the completion of the new housing units built by DEMHAB.
The intense process of squatter removal required the creation of a special unit, the
Operations Service (Servigo de Operag6es-SO), which was linked to the Financial and
Administrative Sub-directory. SO was in charge of the demolition, removal and in
some cases, the reconstruction of the evicted shacks. Despite the active intervention
of DEMHAB in the provision of housing in Porto Alegre, particularly after 1969, the
number of employees until 1975 remained stable, around 200 people, if compared to
the steady increase of workers in subsequent periods (see Table 12).
Acceptance - Phase I and Phase III
The drastic drop in the number of evictions and the implementation of new
national housing policies illustrate the shift from antagonism to acceptance in
DEMHAB's attitude toward squatters. Phases II and III embodied this new approach.
During these two phases, the removal of squatters was significantly lower than in
Phase I. In twelve years, from 1976 to 1988, the number of evicted units reached
3,138, in contrast to 14,408 units removed during Phase I (see Table 10). It was also
during Phase II, that BNH launched a series of programs centered on the upgrading of
invaded areas as a new option for the intervention of the state in the problem of low-
income housing.
In 1975, BNH initiated the Financing Program for Urbanized Lots (Programa de
Financiamento de Lotes Urbanizados-PROFILURB). PROFILURB would only finance
the lot and not the construction of the housing unit, the latter being built through
means other than the formal financing system. In 1977, the Financing Program for the
Construction of Housing (Programa de Financiamento de Construgdo ou Melhoria da
Habitagio-FICAM) would introduce self-help as a means of lowering construction
costs, through the financing of construction material for owners of already legalized
lots. Not until 1979, however, would BNH gather in one program the whole
urbanization of the squatter areas, through the Program of Eradication of Sub-standard
Housing (Programa de Erradicagio de Subhabitagio-PROMORAR). The objective of
the project was to eradicate the squatters from the Brazilian landscape, at this time not
through their removal, but through their incorporation into the urban environment. For
that, it proposed the provision of infrastructure and the legalization of tenure for the
invaded areas. The project included self-help with technical assistance provided by the
authorities, as well as private contractors for the building of the community facilities.
The last program launched by BNH was the self-help Joio de Barro Project, for
families earning 1.5 minimum wages, who had not been benefitted by the earlier
programs.1 What explains the shift from antagonism to acceptance attitudes in
DEMHAB, since there were no changes in the political parties ruling the city and the
country?
Eduardo Vieira, "Quando o Poder Pdblico Promove a Auto-Construgdo ou o Mutirao," 59-60.
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The reawakening of the grassroots movements in Brazil and the large defeat of the
conservative government party in the congressional and state assembly elections in
1974 form the context for DEMHAB's drastic shift in attitude. Firstly, in the
beginning of the 1970s, after almost a decade of strong military repression, the civil
society in Brazil emerged as an active player in the political environment. The church,
the bar association and the press had important roles in the outset of the process. With
the expansion of the political opening through the latter half of the decade, the unions,
professional groups, cultural associations and grassroots movements also entered the
political arena. The grassroots movements were the organization and efforts of the
poorer segment of the urban population to win basic services such as water, sewer,
electricity, housing, health assistance and transportation. The reawakening of the
grassroots movements in Porto Alegre followed the trend of the whole country. In the
second half of the 1970s Vila Campo da Tuca and Vila Ramos, settlements located on
invaded land, began movements demanding the provision of public services in their
areas, with water being the major demand. In 1980, DEMHAB included Vila Ramos
in the PROMORAR Project in Porto Alegre. BNH initiated this national program in
1979, and launched the upgrading of invaded lands.
Secondly, the process of political decompression initiated in 1974 involved a
change in the legitimacy of the authoritarian regime. From a legitimacy process based
on the success of a development model, the government shifted to a process based on
electoral support. Until 1973, Brazil experienced steady economic growth, particularly
in the industrial sector. From 1968 to 1973 the industry growth rate varied from 13
percent to almost 16 percent. In 1974 it fell to 10 percent, beginning a declining
period. With growing difficulties in the economic arena, an increase in the
impoverished population, and the build-up of social pressure and dissent, the
government needed a new basis for legitimacy. State planners believed that it would
be gained through electoral strength. The expected electoral support proved to be
wrong. The elections for Senate, House of Representatives and state assemblies
showed the discontent of the population with the military regime. In 1974, the
opposition liberal party, Brazilian Democratic Movement (Movimento Democritico
Brasileiro-MDB) substantially increased its share in the total number of votes,
compared with the 1966 elections held immediately after the military coup. In the
Senate MDB votes jumped from 43 percent to 59 percent, in the House of
Representatives and state assemblies the figures increased from 35 percent to 48
percent.2
The defeat of the government party along with the strengthening of the civil
society forced the elites in power to make some concessions in their policies in order
to maintain political hegemony. These concessions were directed not only at the
underprivileged classes, who had not benefitted from the economic measures, but also
at the median and upper income classes who felt excluded from access to the decision-
making apparatus of a highly authoritarian regime. The restoration of legal and civil
rights, the easing of direct censorship in the written media, and the recognition of
community organizations were some of these concessions within the political realm.
The government tolerated the existence of the grassroots movements, but still retained
a highly centralized decision-making power.
As a need to better qualify the relationship between the state and the community,
various directors of DEMHAB stimulated the formation of Dwellers Associations.
These associations were created more to facilitate the management of DEMHAB
than to serve as a representative instrument of the community. There was a
2 Maria Helena M. Alves, State and Opposition in Military Brazil (Austin: University of Texas Press,
1985) 142-145.
common constitution to all of them. This constitution copied the patterns of the
military dictatorship, because the presidential elections were not direct 3
The concentration of power in few hands and the identification of people instead
of procedures to solve problems set the tone of DEMHAB's administration during
Phases II and III. These two Phases did not show much difference regarding the
structure of the agency and the form of interaction with the community, in terms of
individual and electoral interests. They differed in the way they responded to the
claims of the organized movement for urban services and participation. When talking
about the acceptance approach, and in comparing it with this Phase, I explain in more
detail the form of interaction and the structure of DEMHAB.
In Phase II, DEMHAB responded with forced acceptance. This response involved
the use of bureaucratic apparatus to stimulate the creation of Community Associations
linked to DEMHAB, with the intent to control and eventually coopt community
leadership. Despite this image of democratic procedure, DEMHAB used its still
strong institutional and economic power to hinder popular initiatives. The Vila Ramos
Upgrading Project was an example of this type of practice.
In 1980, a Commission of Dwellers of Vila Ramos, an organization independent
from the official Community Association of the settlement, held a meeting to examine
the DEMHAB urbanization project proposed for the area. The meeting generated a
committee to carry out an alternative project, since DEMHAB's proposal did not
correspond to the interests of the community. The main differences between
DEMHAB and the alternative project concerned the size of the lots, the width of the
roads, the value of the monthly payments, the size and distribution of common areas
3 Jose Valdir R. da Silva, President of the Vila Nova Gleba Association, 1985-87, interview, 13
November 1990, Porto Alegre.
and the relocation of the displaced families. The following table shows these
differences.
Discrimination Alternative Project DEMHAB Project
1.Area of lots .minimum-150 m2  .minimum-less than 150m2
.same sizes .different sizes
2.Width of roads .minimum - less than 12m .minimum - 12m
3.Monthly payments 5% of minimum wage, without 10% of minimum wage, with
construction of the house. construction of the house
4.Size and distribution of common .various small parks and .one big park
areas inner blocks common areas
5.Relocation of displaced families .use of an existing adjacent area .use of an smaller alternative
adjacent area
Because of frictions between the community and DEMHAB, the committee
conducted a plebiscite to decide which project should be adopted. The plebiscite held
in September of 1981 showed a preference for the alternative project: 55 percent for
the alternative project and 28 percent for the DEMHAB design.4 DEMHAB
administration, though, did not accept the results, accusing the committee of
gerrymandering practices. The City Council supported DEMHAB's decision and
began the implementation of DEMHAB's project in the beginning of 1982.
This example illustrates the still authoritarian and strong power DEMHAB held,
and the confrontational attitudes of both sides. On one hand, the community could
express its discontent, but did not have enough power, including representation in the
parliament to control policy. On the other hand, the state, represented by DEMHAB,
did not have the political will to support or negotiate intermediate solutions.
Phase III was the end of the 20 years of PDS rule in Porto Alegre. In the end of
1985, there were free elections for the city government and a populist party, the
Democratic Labor Party (Partido Democritico Trabalhista-PDT), took office. In Phase
4 Report of the Electoral Committee, Comission of Dwellers of Vila Ramos, Porto Alegre, 21 September
1982.
III, DEMHAB responded to the claims of the organized popular movement with
acceptance and apparent support. Apparent support meant the spreading use of
favoritism toward leaderships in exchange for political support, while not contributing
to the break up of paternalistic and clientelistic practices which persisted among
community and neighborhood associations. In spite of both the city government and
DEMHAB utilizing such practices, the first opened some channels for the
institutionalization of community participation in the making and implementation of
policies. The Popular Councils (Conselhos Populares-CP) were autonomous structures
formed by community organizations within a certain region of the city. Their goal
was to gather these communities for the formulation and discussion of proposals to be
implemented by the city government. Along with the Popular Councils, DEMHAB
carried out self-help projects whose purpose was to involve a greater participation of
the benefitting community. These processes had mixed results. On one hand, as public
policies in a broader context, the Popular Councils were undoubtedly an advance in
contrast with Phase II, when top-down decisions were predominant. They launched a
process where various representatives of distinct communities discussed together the
definition and priorities of DEMHAB's self-help projects. These initiatives
contributed to the breaking down of corporate and competitive practices that
permeated the social movements. On the other hand, in the context of DEMHAB's
interaction with its recipients, the self-help programs themselves did not effectively
contribute to the empowerment of the target communities, because of the prevalence of
still centralized and highly clientelistic approaches.
Support - Phase IV
In 1988 the Popular Front (FP), a progressive coalition of parties, won the
elections in Porto Alegre. The new administration of DEMHAB implemented drastic
changes in the institution. These changes reflected the new philosophy of the agency
regarding its interaction with the community. Whereas the previous administrations
had predominantly had individual to individual relationships, in Phase IV the
relationships between organizations have been stressed. This emphasis has meant the
prioritizing of community associations' demands over individual requests, and creating
channels of participation of the community in the process of implementing projects.
One example of such channels is the participation of the various Community
Associations of Restinga in the process of selection of the recipients of the Cabridiva
Project, a sites and services project implemented by DEMHAB in 1989 in the Restinga
Complex.
The Restinga Complex, located in the southern region of the city, comprises the
Nova Restinga Project and other settlements implemented by DEMHAB since 1969.
In the last five years, these areas have experienced a process of rapid densification
mainly because of invasion of areas reserved for parks and occupation of lots with two
or three units. The lack of open space and situation of overcrowdness motivated the
Community Associations of Restinga to participate in the selection process of the
Cabridlva Project. The main demand of the Association was to assign the project's lots
to the families who were occupying the areas. Representatives of the Association and
of the Social Division of DEMHAB formed a committee to select the applicants. The
committee established the following criteria: 1) families with children would have
priority over those without children; 2) the income of the family should not exceed
three times the minimum wage; 3) lots would be assigned to families that did not own
any other property; and 4) the families who were occupying other people's lots would
have priority over those families occupying invaded land. Based on these criteria, the
Cabridva Project housed 230 families.'
Another example of the present supportive approach is the More Melhor
Participando Project (Live Better by Participating Project), whose implementation
began in March of 1990. This project was financed by DEMHAB and did not depend
on CEF loans. The goal of the project was to legalize the tenure situation of 20 sub-
divisions, that are on public land, and to invest the revenues generated by this
legalization--mortgage payments and land taxes--in the upgrading of these areas. The
Dwellers Associations of these settlements participate in the management and
allocation of resources. A committee formed by representatives of each settlement,
DEMHAB's officials and two NGOs has the goal of defining the areas for priority
intervention and what kinds of works should be conducted.
Until the date of this study, the project was still in a preliminary stage, that is, the
discussion of the project and surveys of the areas.
This shift in attitudes toward community participation in the process of planning
and project implementation also impacted on the structure of the institution. In
addition to a change in the philosophy of the agency towards a modem and technically
oriented format, which differed from Phases II and III, Phase IV involved
organizational changes, decentralizing DEMHAB's structure and reducing the number
of workers. From two main Divisions, DEMHAB now has three Divisions: the
Financial and Administrative Division, the Technical Division and the Housing
Division. The latter is mainly in charge of the management and selling of the housing
' Marcia Kouvaski, President of Nova Santa Rita Community Association since 1988, interview, 13
November 1990, Porto Alegre.
units. This activity was formerly under the coordination of the Financial and
Administrative Division.
Within this reorganization, there was a transformation of the former Operations
Service into the Community Relations Unit (Unidade de Relag6es Comunitirias-URC).
The Operations Unit, created during Phase I to deal with issues related to removal and
relocation of squatters, during Phases II and III has actually housed a peculiar working
category in DEMHAB, the "settlement supervisor" (fiscal de vila). The settlement
supervisor lived in and/or visited settlements that had been built by DEMHAB, and
made weekly or monthly reports of maintenance needs, neighbors' disputes, invasions
of public areas, and other issues related to DEMHAB's responsibilities. These
positions were largely used by DEMHAB's executives to place political appointees,
and as a base for their parties during election times. Many of these appointees were
present or former presidents of community associations. These positions engendered
highly politicized and paternalistic relationships between DEMHAB and the dwellers,
and jeopardized the independence of the grassroots movements.
During Phase IV, the creation of the Community Relations Unit was an attempt to
break down these ties and establish a new pattern of relationship with DEMHAB's
clients. The goal of this new relationship was to facilitate and stimulate the
participation of organized communities located where urbanization projects were
undertaken in the formulation and implementation of the agency's policies. The
technical information of DEMHAB's projects has proved to be the "black box" of the
previous administrations. Without access to information about projects, improvements,
or how the population would be affected by DEMHAB's programs, it was very
difficult for the communities to effectively intervene in the institution's policies. The
withholding of technical knowledge was a form of domination. Hence, the idea of the
Community Relations Unit was to make information accessible to DEMHAB's
recipients. The tecnicos' unwillingness or inexperience in carrying out this educational
task generated the need for a bridge between the project and its recipients. The main
task of the URC officials, then was to mediate the work of tecnicos and the dwellers'
aims. The mediation that URC has provided since its creation has been well regarded
by tecnicos involved in those projects.6 I was unable, though, to check the opinions
of dwellers concerning this subject.
This chapter depicted the changes in the patterns of relationship between
DEMHAB and the community organizations. In Phase I, an authoritarian and
centralized regime has given the political support for the institutionalization of
DEMHAB, but for too high a price--the suppression of civil and political rights. Yet
it has not resisted the political interests of subsequent administrations in Phase II.
Phase III presented a more democratic environment, but it still carried the burden of
clientelistic practices and the use of public institutions for personal and party
advantages. In Phase IV, besides a political commitment at a national and city level
to the democratization of access to urban services including housing, there are
mechanisms that enable community organizations to participate in the decision-making
and execution of public policies. These channels contribute to an understanding and to
control that community organizations can exert on the actions and policies carried out
by the city government and its agencies. This control contributes to reversing the
politicization of public agencies.
The interaction between DEMHAB and community organizations has shown an
increasing level of empowerment translated into new policies and popular participation
within the decision-making process, particularly at a municipal level. These
6 Vicente B. Trindade, Technical Division of DEMHAB, interview, 22 October 1990, Porto Alegre.
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transformations are closely related to the institutional changes that Brazil has
experienced since 1988. The federal, state and city constitutions recently approved
present some advances concerning the urban and housing policies. The social
movements--community organizations, labor unions and professional associations--
along with left-wing parties and progressive sections of the middle class, had a
significant role in the evolution of these policies. It was not the purpose of this study
to detail these innovations, but rather to stress the existence of new institutional
mechanisms that the organized communities have gained in this process. 7
7 For an overview of the constitutional changes in urban policies at a national, state and city level,
particularly Porto Alegre, see Simone A. Pereira, "0 Novo Espago Institucional dos Municipios," and
Suzana Moura, "Perspectivas de Democratizaguo da Gestdo Municipal," in 0 Rio Grande do Sul Urbano,
eds. Naia Oliveira and Tanya Barcellos (Porto Alegre: FEE, 1990) 9-24 and 43-54.
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CONCLUSIONS
In this final chapter, I will summarize the findings and conclusions reached in
the earlier chapters, and show how the three aspects analyzed are intertwined. These
interrelations also lead to new conclusions and give some directions for further
research.
The friction between executives and tecnicos in DEMHAB stemmed from the
control over the processes of purchase of land and selection of applicants for
DEMHAB's units. Whereas tecnicos had the formal responsibilities to determine and
fulfil the established procedures, executives had the informal power to change these
procedures. It was not surprising that the disagreements stemmed from two highly
valuable and demanded assets: urban land and housing. Policy affected such basic
question as what land should be bought from whom, who should have access to public
land, and whether land ought to be developed as plots or houses. This gave
extraordinary bargaining power to the ones who controlled this process in DEMHAB.
The executive's position in DEMHAB offered attractive opportunities for those
seeking political advantages. In exchange for political support, executives
simultaneously favored both elite groups and poorer segments of society. They
favored elites when buying devaluated land, and the urban poor when facilitating their
access to the financing of DEMHAB's units and/or buying invaded areas.
The connection between discontinuity of projects and changes in administrations in
public institutions is a commonplace view among scholars and lay persons. This idea,
however, may not apply to all kinds of projects. When discussing the continuity of
projects in DEMHAB, I argued that the interrelationship between the building process
and the funding process caused the continuity of projects in DEMHAB: the building
process because of its length in time and fragmentation in phases; and the funding
process because of the guarantee of funding in early stages of the project, the ability
of DEMHAB to complement scarce municipal resources and the division of funding
between city and federal governments. Thus, the characteristic of a built product as
the result of the agency's policies made DEMHAB's projects less vulnerable to
disruption.
The shifts in DEMHAB's attitudes, from antagonism, to acceptance and finally to
support, toward community participation in the implementation of policies and projects
were closely related to the changing political and economic environment in Brazil.
The impoverishment of urban population and the dramatic increase in the housing
deficit contributed to this shift in attitude, because of the state's inability to deal with
increasing social pressure and with the magnitude of the problem. However, the
political decompression along with the emergence of grassroots movements in the
1970s, and the institutional changes in the late 1980s had strong impacts on
DEMHAB's actions. These changes proved to be the most effective when, along with
the new mechanisms of representation, there was the political willingness of parties
and executives to operate within established procedures and to promote community
participation. This shifting in relationship between DEMHAB and the community is
still present. A good example of this is the community participation in applicant
selection. The challenge for progressive governments and the grassroots movements
alike is to consolidate these practices in a way to strengthen the popular movements
and to reinforce the fulfillment of institutional procedures within the state and its
various arms, including public agencies.
The three aspects analyzed had close relationships among them. First, electoral
interests and political pressures motivated executives' actions to differ from technical
recommendations. Simultaneously, the lack of institutional channels for popular
participation facilitated executives undertaking such actions. The favors executives
and politicians granted to poorer segments of society have historically proven to be
based on the exchange for electoral support. In DEMHAB, the control of the selection
of applicants for a valuable and individual good, such as housing, offered executives
the opportunity to establish personal interaction between them and the beneficiaries,
strengthening political ties. Three of DEMHAB's executives have run and won
elected positions after leaving office. Two of them have stayed in the direction of
DEMHAB for long periods, enabling them to consolidate electoral bases.
In the process of purchase of land in DEMHAB, the pressures exerted by
landowners and real estate groups were likely to be much greater than the pressures
exerted by grassroots movements. Landowners and real estate groups play a key role
in the urban development in Porto Alegre. A recent study showed that, in 1987, 41
percent of Porto Alegre's urban land was vacant. Moreover this land is highly
concentrated in the hands of few owners, with only 3 percent of the vacant urban land
belonging to the public sector (federal, state and the city).1 This concentration of land
has significant political connotations, as landowners can influence a great deal in the
establishment of land policies and prices.
The attractiveness of executives' position in DEMHAB, given their informal power
to break established procedures, have been enhanced in authoritarian environments and
restrained in situations where there were mechanisms of control to break down such
practices. The conventional forms of democratic representation in society have proved
to be ineffective to stop patronage. The institutionalization of channels of popular
I Naia Oliveira and Tanya Barcellos, Vazios Urbanos em Porto Alegre (Porto Alegre: FEE, 1989),
23-36.
participation appear to be an alternative mechanism for combating clientelistic
practices at various levels, including those found in public agencies such as
DEMHAB.
Second, the characteristic of a built product, its indivisible use and type of
appropriation increase executives' opportunities for clientelistic practices based on
personal interaction. I argue that the type of the built product and the way it is
appropriated by the beneficiary also are factors affecting the major or minor
vulnerability to discontinuity among various types of projects. Projects that offer
access to individual assets, for example housing units or lots, are less vulnerable to
discontinuity than the ones that offer access to collective services, for example
hospitals and schools. The demand for shelter is much higher than the demand for
collective services, because of the advantages it may offer to the individual recipient.
A house or lot may be sold and/or generate extra income through rent, because its a
durable good it can be transferred to other generations. The services offered by
hospitals or schools, in remaining in the state's hands, besides being subject to future
disruption of services, do not offer the material opportunities houses do. Because of
the particular qualities of a housing unit, and the transference of property rights from
the state to the beneficiary, the granting of access to such an asset is very appealing to
those who have the control of its distribution. As stated earlier, in this chapter the
distribution of DEMHAB's units involved a personalistic interaction between
executives and beneficiaries. This kind of interaction set the tone particularly during
phases II and III, in DEMHAB. The political use and personal imprint of DEMHAB's
executives was not being done through the suspension of old projects and
implementation of new programs, but rather through the kind of interaction the
institution carried out with the community it served.
This study has showed that the three aspects analyzed have close relationships
among them. In my view, the political nature of the executives position in DEMHAB
and housing being the product of its policies cause interference in the distribution of
the product and the operation of the agency. These relationships, however, are
complex and many times not visible at a first glance.
Among the issues analyzed in this thesis, some deserve further studies, because of
their unexpected findings or controversial nature. First, the continuity of projects in
DEMHAB is still intriguing. A comparative study among various public agencies
may corroborate or contradict the argument I presented to explain the continuity of
projects in DEMHAB. The analysis of the implementation of different types of
projects by distinct city agencies and the way their products affect the target
population might show significant differences concerning their vulnerability to
disruption. Second, the opposition between urban standards and capacity to pay for
the fulfillment of these standards appeared as one source of disagreement, not only
between executives and tecnicos but also between professionals themselves. The
notion of standards is embedded by cultural, economic and social values. Whereas in
Brazil the minimum lot size for low-income housing is.125 M2, in India lots with the
same characteristics have an area of 15 m2. A comparative study between solutions
adopted by the informal sector and those imposed by city codes and plans may show
that accepted urban standards and regulations were not designed considering the needs
of poorer segments of society. Third and last, the bipolarity between technical
recommendations and political decisions permeated much of the discussion of this
study. The perception of opposition of technical assessment to political action has
dominated the environment of public institutions for various years in Brazil. The
advent of new institutional channels and political practices may illuminate the way to
an alternative situation where politics is not view as bad and opportunistic but as a
legitimate way of organization and representation of society. This issue, more than
studied, needs to be practiced.
APPENDIX A
NATIONAL HOUSING POLICIES
The origins of BNH - In 1946 the national government created the Foundation of
Popular Housing (Fundagio da Casa Popular-FCP), the-first nationwide institution in
charge of the provision of housing for the low-income population. Prior to FCP,
various organizations and professional retirement funds financed housing only for their
members. Besides utilization of grants and transfers from the National Treasury, FCP
would collect its funds through a 1 percent tax on any real estate transaction, in which
the transfer tax exceeded 100,000 cruzeiros. In 1951, because of inefficiency in the
collection of this tax at the state level, the tax was abolished and FCP was
incorporated into the national annual budget.
It was not a coincidence that both the national and Porto Alegre initiatives were
launched in 1946. At this time, the country was experiencing a period of
democratization, after seven years of rule by an authoritarian regime.' The FCP, at
the national level, and the Service of Housing, in Porto-Alegre, were the response of
the state to the growing organization and influence of left wing parties among the
urban workers, who claimed for access to low-income housing and urban services.
Technical and administrative constraints, scarce resources, lack of strong political
support at the state and city level, and the use of institutions for clientelistic practices
contributed towards the failure of FCP to build an institutional capacity to respond to
I In November of 1937, supported by the military, president Getulio Vargas suspended the presidential
elections and installed an authoritarian regime (the Estado Novo). For an overview of Brazilian history and
politics of this period see, Thomas E. Skidmore, Politics in Brazil, 1930-64: An experiment in democracy
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1967).
the growing demand for its services.2 The overthrow of the populist government in
1964 by a military coup represented a drastic change for housing policy in Brazil.
The Structure of BNH and of the Housing Finance System - In August of 1964,
the new military dictatorship created BNH and the Housing Finance System (SFH) to
coordinate public housing policies, to stimulate private savings and investment, and to
assist the construction industry. The choice of the housing sector as the axis for urban
policy was threefold. The new housing policies would attempt to minimize tension in
the growing urban areas, would emphasize the ideology of homeownership and would
increase the number of jobs (in Brazil, the construction industry absorbs a large
amount of the unskilled labor force). The establishment and support of a network of
private and public enterprise for financing, capturing resources, and constructing of
units were crucial for the implementation of the SFH's policies.3
The SFH was divided into two main financing organizations: the National Housing
Bank-BNH and the Brazilian Savings and Loan System (Sistema Brasileiro de
Poupanga e Emprestimo-SBPE). BNH assisted in the financing of low-income
housing, also called "social" housing and SBPE in the financing of median and high-
income housing, also called "median" housing.
BNH financing was directed at two distinct markets: the popular market and the
economic market. The popular market included families earning from 1 to 3 times the
minimum wage and had the Housing Companies-COHABs in charge of the financing
of the units. The economic market included families earning from 3 to 6 times the
2 From 1946 to 1960, FCP had built 16,964 housing units. The spatial distribution of FCP units
showed that neither Sao Paulo, nor Porto Alegre, growing industrial cities, were benefitted with FCP
housing. For a detailed discussion of the housing policies and performance of FCP see Azevedo and
Andrade, Habitaco e Poder, 20-39.
3 Erminia Maricato, Politica Habitacional no Regime Militar (Rio de Janeiro: Vozes, 1987), 30.
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minimum wage and had the Housing Cooperatives (Cooperativas Habitacionais-
COOPHABs) in charge of the financing of the units.
SBPE finance was directed to the median market, that included families with
monthly earnings over 6 times the minimum wage.4 SBPE contained various private
and public institutions that administered the finance of units for the median market.
On the private side there were the Private Savings and Loans Associations (Sociedade
de Crdito Imobilliirio-SCIs) and the Mutual Savings and Loan Associations
(Associag6es de Poupanga e Empr6stimo-APEs), and on the public side, there were the
existing Federal and State Savings Banks (Caixa Econ6mica Federal-CEF and Caixas
Econ6micas Estaduais-CEEs).
The Housing Finance System captured its resources from two main sources:
compulsory and voluntary savings. Compulsory savings corresponded to 8 percent of
the monthly wages of regular workers. This compulsory account is collected by the
state and deposited into the Length of Service Guarantee Fund (Fundo de Garantia por
Tempo de Servigo-FGTS).' Voluntary savings were captured by the thrift institutions
through Indexed Savings Accounts (Cadernetas de Poupanga-CPs). CPs paid 6 percent
of interest a year with balances adjusted every three months, due to inflation. BNH
centralized the regulation of the terms and conditions of loans, the assignment of
credit institutions, and the index of savings accounts. The construction of the units,
regardless of the segment of the market, was done by the private sector.
4 Later the limits were raised from 3 to 10 minimum wages.'Presently, COHABs finance units for
families earning until 10 minimum wages and the SBPE for families earning above 10 minimum wages.
The reason for these changes was the gap between the capacity of the lower income segments to pay and
the constant increase of construction costs.
5 The workers could withdraw the FGTS in case of illness, retirement or unemployment.
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The whole housing finance system was based on indexing. Until 1980, both
corrections of assets and liabilities were based on the same index. The skyrocketing
inflation in the 1980s, caused a change in the system.
Savings accounts and the unpaid principal on mortgages were adjusted each month
using the Variable-rate National Treasury Bond (Obrigagio Reajustivel do Tesouro
Nacional-ORTN), whereas mortgage payments were adjusted quarterly using the
Standard Capital Unit (Unidade Padrio de Capital-UPC).6 The value of ORTN was
adjusted each month according to the national wholesale price index. The UPC, an
indexing mechanism used by BNH until the 1980s, was adjusted quarterly, according
to the monthly revaluation of the ORTN. At the beginning of each quarter, ORTN
and UPC had the same values.7
Loans of the popular and economic markets, hereafter called social market, were
different from those of the median market. The social market had a cross subsidy,
where borrowers with higher incomes paid higher interest rates to compensate for
lower rates paid by lower income borrowers. COHABs and COOPHABs charged
between 1 percent and 10 percent interest a year depending on the size of the loan.
Mortgage loans varied from 20 to 25 years. The SBPE charged from 10 percent to 12
percent interest a year with the mortgage loans ranging from 15 to 25 years."
6 David M. Vetter, "Financing National Investment Programs for Human Settlements Development in
Brazil", (Draft,25 September 1989).
7 Roger Sandilands, Monetary Correction and Housing Finance in Colombia, Brazil and Chile,
(Farnborough: Gower, 1980) 148.
8 The interest rates were reduced in 1975. For the social market, they were reduced from 1%-10% to
1%-8.6%. For the median market, they were reduced from 10%-12% to 6%-10%. See Roger J. Sandilands,
Monetary Correction and Housing Finance in Colombia, Brazil and Chile (Farnborough:gower, 1980) 123-
144.
APPENDIX B
NOVA RESTINGA PROJECT AND VILA TRONCO PROJECT
Nova Restinga- New Construction Project
In May of 1969, DEMHAB purchased a 142 ha tract of land in the rural southern
part of Porto Alegre to place the population which had been removed from other areas
of the city. Since DEMHAB had not entered the housing finance system -SFH- at that
time, its scarce resources were not enough to buy land closer to the urbanized areas of
the city. The Nova Restinga Project was the first of DEMHAB's projects to include
the implementation of infrastructure along with construction of brick housing units.
Previous city housing policy had been to sell unserviced lots with a house, as a means
of making houses affordable for low-income segments of the population. The lots
were larger (300m2) than today (150m 2 and 108m 2), homes were clad in wood, which
in the past was cheaper than brick, and homes were larger (4 rooms= 42m2) in
comparison with the largest homes of the New project (3 bedrooms=36.5m 2). This
Project represented the beginning of the DEMHAB and BNH lending relationship.
The initial project, contracted out by DEMHAB and designed by two well known
architects of Porto Alegre, comprised 3,800 housing units divided into 4
"Neighborhood Units". Besides an elementary school, day-care, and commercial
center, each Neighborhood Unit had 4 different types of houses: core units (16.8 m2),
one bedroom (23.8 m2), two bedroom (30.2 M2) and three bedroom (36.5 m2). In the
geographical core of the project area, there were educational, recreational, and cultural
centers as well as church, commercial and health services. Projects were financed by
BNH who proposed implementation of an industrial district adjacent to the residential
area. The Industrial District had an area of 160 ha. and was designed to place non-
pollutant industries, retail and services, as well as parks and recreational areas. Firms
located in the district would generate 5,600 new jobs. The implementation of the
Industrial District would minimize one of the biggest problems of the Nova Restinga
Project, namely, the distance of the settlement from the more dense areas of the city
and the insufficient means of transportation available. The Nova Restinga project
foresaw a population of approximately 20,000 dwellers.
In September of 1969 the bulldozer work began in the area chosen for the 1st
Neighborhood Unit. During 1970, DEMHAB carried out topographic surveys,
infrastructure projects and construction, and architectural design of Nova Restinga.
From January of 1971 to July of 1972, DEMHAB built the First Neighborhood Unit
with 1004 houses and Elementary School, Day-Care and Commercial Center. From
1972 until the end of 1974 DEMHAB conducted the ground clearing, infrastructure
and road works of the 2nd and 3rd Neighborhood Units. Construction of 602 houses of
the 2nd Neighborhood Unit did not begin until March of 1975. These units were
completed by the end of 1975. Subsequent to the completion of the 2nd
Neighborhood Unit, the 3rd Unit was initiated and completed in August of 1976, with
816 houses. The 4th Unit, with 1086 dwellings, was built in a period of three years,
from 1977 to 1980. The implementation of the whole project, which was intended to
take three years and build 3,800 houses, according to the BNH-DEMHAB contract,
lasted for ten years, consisted of 3,508 units, and was managed by three different
directors, indeed representing the same conservative party.' If one were to divide the
project into three main phases, as separate projects, the duration of each phase would
be as follows:
1st Neighborhood Unit- 1004 units- September 1969-July 1972 - 3 years
2nd/3rd Neighborhood Units- 1418 units- August 1972-August 1976 - 4 years
'See Accord BNH-DEMHAB, 1971, DEMHAB Archives.
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4th Neighborhood Unit- 1086 units- 1977-1980 - 4 years
These figures confirm the estimates given by DEMHAB's tecnicos earlier in this
study, when asked about the time lag between the date of the loan commitment and
the time of the sale of the unit for the first family.
Continuity and Changes of the Nova Restinga Project Due to the low density of
the original project that was designed with detached houses on single plots, the
administration handling Phase II built walk-up apartments to increase the density in
the area. The two housing complexes built by DEMHAB, from 1977 to 1980, had
512 and 416 apartments each, adding 928 families to the population of Nova Restinga.
During this same administration, in 1978, DEMHAB purchased some land to build the
5th Neighborhood Unit of the Nova Restinga Project. DEMHAB did not begin
construction of the 5th Unit until 1989. The Nova Esperanga Project is expected to
have 609 lots. Of these, 450 lots will be developed with core houses (room, kitchen
and bathroom). The Cabrid'va Project was completed in 1990, with 215 lots. This is
the only project being implemented with DEMHAB's own resources. It is important
to point out the change in the size of lots implemented by DEMHAB. Whereas the 4
Neighborhood Units had 10x15 m (150m 2) lots, the 5th unit is being built with 6x18
m (108m 2) lots. The decrease in the lot size is due to an increase in infrastructure
costs concurrent with a decline in the real minimum wage during the last decade.
Adjacent to the Nova Restinga Project, there are other settlements on areas that
also belong to DEMHAB. The entire section is now called the Restinga Complex.
According to DEMHAB's estimates, the population of the Restinga Complex was
close to 100,000 people in the beginning of 1990. The Industrial District was not
implemented until 1990 due to problems of the legal status of part of the land
designated for this use.

Vila Tronco- Urbanization Project
The Vila Tronco Project is an example of a prolonged urbanization project. Works
on this project began in 1987, during Phase III administration of DEMHAB, and was
still being implemented at the end of 1990, by Phase IV administration.
The settlement with 2,500 families is part of a larger area which comprises other
illegal settlements and very active Neighborhood associations. DEMHAB has faced
problems with the neighboring associations that complain a large investment is being
made in one single area whereas nothing is done for the adjacent zones. Because of
the source of the funds that come from BNH/CEF and the characteristics of the loan
agreement, these resources cannot be used in areas other than the ones included in the
original Vila Tronco Project. The time lag between the loan commitment and the
construction schedule has caused a deflation in the value of the original loan, which is
not sufficient to cover the costs for the completion of the project. Added to that, an
the increase in the population of the area between 1987 and 1990, required larger
alternative areas to move the families displaced by the roads and infrastructure
construction. After the closure of BNH in 1986, CEF was not assigned loans for the
purchase of land, constraining DEMHAB to work with its existing areas.
Table 1:
SQUATTERS INPORTO ALEGRE- 1951/1990
YEAR SETTL. UNITS SQUAT.POP. TOTAL POP. %SQUAT.POP.
1951 41 3,965 16,303 418,864 3.90
PHASE I 1965 56 13,588 65,595 748,878 8.76
1972/73 124 20,152 105,833 950,142 11.14
PHASE II 1980/81 146 40,814 171,419 1,125,901 15.23
1983/84 167 39,909 180,489 1,275,483 14.15
PHASE III 1988 * * * 1,378,762 *
PHASE IV 1990 222 * 347,847 1,431,924 24.29
Source(s): - 1951- PMPA, Levantamento Econ6mico Social das Malocas Existentes em Porto Alegre
(Porto Alegre: PMPA,195 1).
* 1965- DEMHAB, "Levantamento Universal e as Necessidades S6cio Habitacionais de Porto
Alegre" (Porto Alegre: DEMHAB, 1966).
* 1972/73- DEMHAB, "Levantamento" (Porto Alegre: DEMHAB,1966).
* 1980/81- FEE-METROPLAN, Regido Metropolitana de Porto Alegre (Porto Alegre: FEE-
METROPLAN, 1988).
* 1983/84- Ibid.
* 1990- SPM, "Selegio das Micro-Regi6es e Areas de Carencia p/ Intervengio Prioritiria"
(Porto Alegre: SPM-PMPA, 1990).
Note(s): (1) The 1990 data are estimates from 1986 and 1989 surveys undertaken by other secretaries.
(2) * - Data not available
Table 2:
POPULATION OF PORTO ALEGRE - 1940/1990
YEAR POPULATION (a) GROWTH RATE (b)
1940 272232 -
1950 394151 44.78%
1960 641137 62.66%
1970 885545 38.12%
1980 1125477 27.09%
1990 1431924 27.23%
Source(s) (a) Census- IBGE
(b) PROPUR-UFRGS, A produgio da Habitagio-O caso da Regiio Metropolitana
de Porto Alegre (Porto Alegre:PROPUR-UFRGS/FINEP, 1987)18.
(c) 1990-FEE-METROPLAN, Regiso Metropolitana de Porto Alegre (Porto Alegre:
FEE/METROPLAN,1988) 103.
Note(s): (1) The 1990 data is estimated. The Brazilian gov. has not done the 1990 census.
(2) * Data not available.
Table 3:
AREA (ha) OF PORTO ALEGRE- 1988
TOTAL % RURAL % URBAN % URBANVACANT % URBAN VACANT %
TOTAL CITY GOVERNM.
48,900 100 16,155 33.04 32,745 66.96 13,714 41.88 134.35 0.98
Source(s) Naia Oliveira and Tanya Barcellos, Vazios Urbanos em Porto Alegre (Porto Alegre: FEE,1989) 33.
* FEE-METROPLAN, Regiio Metropolitana de Porto Alegre (Porto Alegre: FEE, 1988) 93.
Note(s): (1) Urban vacant areas correspond to the sum of unoccupied lots.They do not include parksroads,etc
(2) City Government urban vacant areas include areas owned by the city government and DEMHAB
Table 4:
AREAS PURCHASED BY DEMHAB- 1951/1990
YEAR AREA (ha)
1952 - 1964 1952/64 525.44
PHASE I 1969 142.00
1965/75
Subtotal 142.00
PHASE II 1975/79 272.40
1975/85 1980 297.32
1981 17.63
1982 29.68
1985 85.60
Subtotal 702.63
PHASE II 1986/88 -20
1986/88
PHASE IV 1989 -50
1989/90
TOTAL 1,440.07
DEMHAB, Annual Reports (Porto Alegre: DEMHAB,1981,1982,1985)Source:
Table 5:
DEMHAB AND CITY, STATE, AND NATIONAL GOVERNMENT- BRAZIL- 1964/1990
DEMHAB (a) CITY-PORTO ALEGRE (b) STATE-RIO GRANDE DO SUL (c) NATIONAL-BRAZIL (d)
1964 Populist-PT B Conservative/Liberal- UDN/PSD Populist-PTB1
Sereno Chaise 01/64-04/64 Ildo Meneguetti- 01/63-01/67 Joao Goulart 08/61-04/64
Mar-64 Military Coup
Conservative-ARENA(PDS) Conservative-ARENA(PDS) Conservative- ARENA(PDS)
PHASE I Milton P. Oliveira 06/65-01/69 C61io M. Fernandes 04/64-01/69 Ildo Meneguetti 01/63-01/67 Mar. Castelo Branco- 04/64-03/67
1965/75 Peracchi Barcellos 01/67-01/71 Mar. Costa e Silva 03/67-08/69
Roberto C. Silva 01/69-03/71 T. Thompson Flores 01/69-04/75 Euclides Triches 01/71-03/75 Gen.Garrastazu Mdic 10/69-03/74
Norman P. Arruda 03/71-04/75
PHASE II Reginaldo Pujol 04/75-08/76 G. Socias Villela 04/75-04/83 Synval Guazelli 03/75-03/79 Gen.Ernesto Geisel 034-0379
1976/85 Miguel Scalabrin 08/76-01/77 Amaral Souza 03/9-03/83 Gen.Joo Figueiredo 03/79-03/85
Arthur Zanella 01/77-02/82
Sarjob A. Neto 02/82-04/83 Elections Nov-82
Conservative-PDS
Reginaldo Pujol 04/83-07/85 Joso Dib 04/83-01/86 Jair Soares 03/83-03/87
Ruy Medeiros 07/85-01/86 Electoral College Jan-85
Elections Nov-85 Conservative/Liberal-PFL/PMDB
Populist-PDT
PHASE III Alvaro P. Cunha 01/86-02/87 Alceu Collares 01/86-01/89 Elections Nov-86 Jos6 Sarney 03/85-03/90
1986/88 Dilamar Machado 02/87-05/88 Liberal-PMDB
Carlos Gomes 05/88-01/89 Pedro Simon 03/87-03/91
Elections Nov-88
Progressive-FP (PT/PCdoB/PSB) Elections Nov-89
PHASE IV Lires Marques 01/89- Olivio Dutra 01/89- Elections Nov-90 Conservative-PRN
1989/ Populist-PDT Fernando C. Mello 03/90-
Alceu Collares 04/91-
Source(s): (a) DEMHAB, Archives, 1990.
(b) Correio do Povo (Porto Alegre, 19 September 1982).
(c) Fid6lis D. Barbosa, Hist6ria do RGS (Escola Sup. Sso Lourengo de Brindes, 1983).
(d) Thomas E. Skidmore, The Politics of Military Rule in Brazil, 1964-85 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988).
Table 6:
PROFESSIONAL BACKGROUND-POLITICAL TRAJECTORY-DEMHAB'S DIRECTORS
DEMHAB's DIRECTORS PROFESSION AND POLITICAL TRAJECTORY
PHASE I Milton P. Oliveira 06/65-01/69 .non-university education, DEMHAB staff
1965/75 City Councilor - 1960-63 and 1964-67
Roberto C. Silva 01/69-0371 .*
Norman P. Arruda 03/71-04(75 .architect, COHAB and DEMHAB staff
PHASE II Reginaldo Pujol 04/75-08f76 .lawyer
1976/85 1972-elected City Councilor.
1976-2nd-21 elected City Councilors; 14,914 votes,total-448,13(
Miguel Scalabrin 08/76-01/77 .engineer, DEMHAB staff
Arthur Zanella 01/77-02/82 .economist
1982-6th-33 elected City Councilors; 10,696 votes,total-571,403
1988-26th-33 elected City Councilors;3,166 votes,total-720,685
Sarjob A. Neto 02/82-04/83 .*, DEMHAB staff
Reginaldo Pujol 04/83-07/85 .lawyer
Ruy Medeiros 07/85-01/86 .engineer, DEMHAB staff
PHASE III Alvaro P. Cunha 01/86-02/87 .medical doctor
1986/88
Dilamar Machado 02/87-05/88 .lawyer and radio journalist
1982-elected state representative
1988-13th-33 elected City Councilors;4,185 votes,total-720,685
Carlos Gomes 05/88-01/89 .lawyer
PHASE IV Lires Marques 01/89- .sociologist
1989/
Source(s): (1)As Eleig6es no Rio Grande do Sul (Porto Alegre:Sintese, n.d.).
(2)TRE-RS, Eleigbes 1982 and 1988/89.
(3)Cimara Municipal, Dep. Recursos Humanos
(4) DEMHAB archives
Note(s): * Data not available
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Table 7:
PRODUCTION OF HOUSES, APARTMENTS, AND LOTS
DEMHAB, COHAB-RS, AND BNH- 1965/1990
TOTAL 11,195 99,902 4,571,254
DMCP 1952/64 7,630
TOTAL 18,825
Source(s): DEMHAB 1952/80- Marisa N.S. Pinho, "Atuagio do DEMHAB na Problematica
Habitacional, Porto Alegre," (Bach. thesis, UNISINOS, 1980).
1980/90- DEMHAB, Unidade de Cobranga (Porto Alegre, 1990).
COHAB-F 1965/87- COHAB, "A COHAB que recebemos-Rel.1987" (Porto Alegre, 1988).
1988/90- COHAB (Porto Alegre, 1990).
BNH- 1967/73- Roger Sandilands, Monetary Correction and Housing Finance in
Colombia, Brazil and Chile (Farnborough:Gower, 198) 141.
1974/88- BNH-ABECIP, (1988).
Note(s): (1) BNH data refer only to houses and apartments.
(2) * - Data not available
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YEAR
PHASE I 1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
PHASE H 1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
PHASE III 1986
1987
1988
PHASE IV 1989
1990
DEMHAB
0
0
227
0
26
0
390
614
0
0
602
816
33
599
116
2,521
704
0
1,127
112
1,924
96
120
109
242
817
COHAB-RS
4,345
2,205
1,687
870
195
125
0
1
96
777
0
201
829
2,229
4,786
8,987
6,264
13,861
15,166
8,960
6,485
1,486
12,608
2,623
1,903
3,213
BNH
*
*
104,100
165,600
178,800
161,600
131,400
101,700
120,800
96,205
141,929
273,763
267,713
337,649
383,223
627,342
465,388
541,129
77,247
86,358
59,657
40,977
30,774
177,900
*
*
Table 8:
PRODUCTION OF HOUSES, APARTMENTS AND LOTS - DEMHAB- 1952/1990
HOUSES APART. TOTALYEAR
DMCP 1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
PHASE I 1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
PHASE II 1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
PHASE III 1985
1986
1987
1988
PHASE IV 1989
1990
TOTAL
LOTS
988
655
596
220
482
0
7
1,202
187
0
0
0
853
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
527
52
923
0
0
1,127
0
1,188
0
0
0
218
137
9,362
Source(s): 1952/80- Marisa N.S. Pinho "Atuagio do DEMHAB na Problematica Habitacional, Porto Alegre,"
(Bach. thesis, UNISINOS, 1980).
1980/90- DEMHAB, Unidade de Cobranga (Porto Alegre, 1990)
Note(s): (1) The production refers to units completed each year.
(2) Lots refers to vacant lots.
(3) Houses refer to house and lot.
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I
546
611
20
537
135
0
171
16
0
0
0
0
404
0
0
227
0
26
0
390
614
0
0
602
816
33
72
64
1,086
0
0
0
112
0
0
120
0
24
40
6,666
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
512
704
0
0
0
736
96
0
109
0
640
2,797
1534
1266
616
757
617
0
178
1,218
187
0
0
0
1,257
0
0
227
0
26
0
390
614
0
0
602
816
33
599
116
2,521
704
0
1,127
112
1,924
96
120
109
242
817
18,825
Table 9:
DEFAULT RATES - DEMHAB- 1980/1990
Year Units No Default Default Rates
TOTAL Vacant % Sold % Paymt. % N/Def. % 1Mth. % 2Mth. % 3Mth. % '+3Mth % Total %
1980 4,723 508 11 0 0 4,215 89 2,593 62 1,240 29 198 5 44 1 140 3 1,622 38
1981 5,646 928 16 0 0 4,718 84 1,373 29 2,166 46 395 8 166 4 618 13 3,345 71
1982 5,651 870 15 0 0 4,781 85 492 10 819 17 1,829 38 662 14 979 20 4,289 90
1983 5,985 510 9 283 5 5,192 87 545 10 1,824 35 958 18 619 12 1,246 24 4,647 90
1984 5,647 298 5 415 7 4,934 87 886 18 1,803 37 489 10 414 8 1,342 27 4,048 82
1985 6,317 436 7 507 8 5,374 85 1,272 24 1,575 29 563 10 350 7 1,614 30 4,102 76
1986 8,408 2,594 31 562 7 5,252 62 1,062 20 1,476 28 593 11 456 9 1,665 32 4,190 80
1987 9,026 2,103 23 668 7 6,255 69 2,718 43 1,106 18 493 8 400 6 1,538 25 3,537 57
1988 9,135 1,969 22 741 8 6,425 70 1,936 30 878 14 486 8 466 7 2,659 41 4,489 70
1989 9,377 1,994 21 948 10 6,435 69 4,617 72 381 6 194 3 190 3 1,053 16 1,818 28
1990 10,194 2,049 20 1,018 10 7,127 70 3,990 56 735 10 558 8 912 13 932 13 3,137 44
Source: DEMHAB, Divisso de Arrecadagso, 1990.
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Table 10:
SQUATTER REMOVAL- DEMHAB- 1965/1990
YEAR UNITS PEOPLE
PHASE I 1965 * *
1966 886 3,916
1967 1,417 6,263
1968 680 3,006
1969 1,154 5,770
1970 1,266 6,330
1971 2,350 9,391
1972 2,988 12,108
1973 2,487 11,084
1974 822 3,511
1975 358 1,459
PHASE II 1976 124 518
1977 70 309
1978 213 941
1979 264 1,167
1980 179 791
1981 245 1,083
1982 184 813
1983 225 995
1984 450 1,989
1985 590 2,608
PHASE III 1986 155 685
1987 151 667
1988 288 1,273
PHASE IV 1989 96 424
1990 * *
TOTAL 17,642 77,102
Source(s): 1966f74- DEMHAB, Annual Reports (Porto Alegre, 1965-1974)
1975/89- PMPA, Anuario" Estatistica" (Porto Alegre, 1977-1990)
Note(s): (1) The population data from 1968 and from 1975 to 1989 were estimated based on an
average of 4.42 people per unit.
(2) * - Data not available
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Table 11:
PERCENTAGE Of DEMHAB'S UNITS SOLD TO CIVIL SERVANTS- 1970/1990
PROJECTS PER YEAR
Year
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1980
1980
1980
1980
1980
tot/80
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1985
1985
1985
1985
tot/85
1986
1986
1986
1986
1986
1986
1986
1986
tot/86
1987
1987
tot/87
1988
1988
tot/88
1989
1990
TOTAL PROJECTS PER YEAR
C.Serv. %
PHASE I
3.64
3.81
Units
0
390
614
0
0
602
816
0
0
0
1,086
512
416
949
288
871
4,122
0
265
0
146
32
48
32
416
320
848
96
32
36
48
9
8
48
109
386
16
24
40
151
640
791
218
0
PHASE II
PHASE III
PHASE IV
Year
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
Units
0
390
614
0
0
602
816
0
0
0
4,122
0
265
0
146
848
386
40
791
218
0
C.Serv.
14
23
0
0
90
408
0
0
0
1,643
0
46
0
29
246
210
24
254
32
0
0.00
3.64
3.81
0.00
0.00
15.00
50.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
39.86
0.00
17.53
0.00
19.57
29.00
54.40
60.00
32.11
14.82
0.00
14
23
0
0
90
408
0
0
0
652
128
333
38
144
348
1,643
0
46
0
29
27
37
14
85
83
246
37
17
14
10
4
0
32
96
210
9
15
24
58
196
254
32
0
15.00
50.00
60.00
25.00
80.00
4.00
50.00
40.00
39.85
17.53
19.57
84.38
77.08
43.75
20.41
25.94
29.00
38.54
53.13
38.89
20.83
44.44
0.00
66.67
88.24
54.45
56.25
62.50
60.00
38.41
30.65
32.13
14.82
(1) Civil servants refer to federal, state
and city levels.
(2) The date refer to the year the recipients
signed the contract, and not the year of
completion of construction.
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TOTAL 9,238 3,020 32.69
TOTAL 9,238 3,020 32.69
Source(s): DEMHAB, Unidade de Cobranga (Porto
Alegre, 1990).
Note(s):
Table 12:
EMPLOYEES- DEMHAB- 1972/1990
YEAR
PHASE I 1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
PHASE II 1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
PHASE III 1986
1987
1988
PHASE IV 1989
1990
Source(s): 1972/1976- PMPA,Anuario "Estatistica" (Porto Alegre,1978).
1977/1987- PMPA, Anuirio "Estatistica" (Porto Alegre,1988).
1988 - PMPA, Anuario "Estatistica" (Porto Alegre, 1989).
1989/1990- DEMHAB, Departamento Pessoal (Porto Alegre,1990).
Note(s): (1) The data refer to the month of December of each year.
(2) * - Data not available
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EMPLOYEE % INCREASE
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
196
235 19.90
214 -8.94
211 -1.40
298 41.23
259 -13.09
263 1.54
302 14.83
374 23.84
398 6.42
478 20.10
552 15.48
591 7.07
696 17.77
712 2.30
855 20.08
908 6.20
642 -29.30
661 2.96
Table 12:
PRODUCTION AND EMPLOYEES-DEMHAB- 1965/1990
TOTAL 11,195
DMCP 1952-64 7,630
TOTAL 18,825
Table 7 and Table 12
(1) * Data not available
(2) Units refer to houses, lots and apartments
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Source(s):
Note(s):
YEAR
PHASE I 1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
PHASE II 1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
PHASE III 1986
1987
1988
PHASE IV 1989
1990
UNITS EMPLOYEES
0 *
0 *
227 *
0 *
26 *
0 *
390 *
614 196
0 235
0 214
602 211
816 298
33 259
599 263
116 302
2,521 374
704 398
0 478
1,127 552
112 591
1,924 696
96 712
120 855
109 908
242 642
817 661
Graph 1:
PRODUCTION OF HOUSES, APARTMENTS AND LOTS DEMHAB- 1952/1990
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